ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 95
YEVAMOS 91-95 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi
publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.
(a) We learn that having relations with a wife's sister does not forbid his
wife to him from "Osah". Despite the fact that the Torah does not
specifically forbid her, we nevertheless need a Pasuk for that; otherwise we
have thought that she is forbidden - because if in the case of a 'lighter
Isur' (Eishes Ish - as we shall see later), the man, who causes his wife to
be forbidden, becomes forbidden to take her back, then how much more so in
the case of a more stringent one (Achos Ishah), should the woman, who causes
her sister to become forbidden to her husband, be forbidden to return to her
(b) According to Rebbi Yehudah, Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that
relations with one's mother-in-law forbids his wife to him. They argue over
our case (whether he becomes forbidden through relations with his wife's
sister. Beis Hillel permit it because of "Osah". Beis Shamai forbid it
because of the 'Kal va'Chomer' that we just cited; and they do not hold of
the D'rashash from "Osah".
(c) According to Rebbi Yossi, Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel both agree that
relations with his wife's sister do not forbid her to him. Their Machlokes
concerns - whether relations with his mother-in-law forbid his wife to him
(a) A man who marries a woman forbids his wife more than she forbids him -
inasmuch as *he* forbids her to everyone, whereas *she* only forbids him to
(b) Rebbi Yossi extrapolates from there that if a man has relations with his
wife's sister be'Shogeg, she remains permitted to him - because, if his wife
(whose Isur is relatively severe) remains permitted after a Bi'as Isur
be'Shogeg, then if the man (whose Isur is relatively light) performs a Bi'as
Isur (with his wife's sister), then she should certainly remain permitted to
(c) Rebbi Ami Amar Resh Lakish derives Rebbi Yehudah's opinion (that
relations with a man's mother-in-law forbids his wife to him) from the Pasuk
"ba'Eish Yisrefu Oso *ve'Es'hen*" - which, seeing as it cannot possibly
come to sentence both women to S'reifah (as we explained above), it must
come 'Im Eino Inyan' to teach us that both women become forbidden through
relations with his mother-in-law.
(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel took that man who had relations with his
mother-in-law - and gave him Makas Mardus (mi'de'Rabbanan).
(b) When he told him that if not for Shmuel, he would have forbidden him
permanently - he meant that, had Shmuel not ruled like Rebbi Yossi, he would
have forbidden him to live with his wife (like the opinion of Rebbi
(a) We learned above that, if not for the Pasuk "Osah" we would have
forbidden a woman to her husband on the basis of his having had relations
with her sister, from a 'Kal va'Chomer'. Rav Chisda initially learns the
'Kal va'Chomer' from Machzir G'rushaso - referring to when the first husband
contravened the La'av (a light Isur) of remarrying his wife, and who now
forbids her to return to her second husband (who was the cause of her
becoming prohibited to her first husband).
(b) We reject this 'Kal va'Chomer' however, on the basis of the two
stringencies that Machzir G'rushaso have over Achos Ishto - 1. that the
woman too, contravened the La'av (which is not the case when her husband had
relations with her sister), and 2. the prohibition that he contravened is a
permanent one (whereas Achos Ishto only remains in force as long as his wife
(c) So Resh Lakish learns the 'Kal va'Chomer' from a Yevamah. For two
reasons, this cannot mean a Yevamah who had relations with someone from the
Shuk, one of them because, unlike Achos Ishto, where the wife herself did
not sin, here she did. In addition - the La'av of Yevamah le'Shuk forbids
her to everybody (whereas that of Achos Ishto only forbids the sister to her
husband, but not to anyone else).
(a) So we establish the 'Kal va'Chomer' from Yevamah le'Achim. It is obvious
that this cannot be referring to a Yevamah who had relations with someone
else (like Rav Hamnuna, who forbids her to the brothers) - because here
again, a Yevamah is more stringent than Achos Ishto, inasmuch as firstly,
she herself sinned, and secondly, she is forbidden to everyone (neither of
which is the case by Achos Ishto - as we asked earlier).
(b) The case of Yevamah must therefore be - Yevamah le'Achim, when one
brother made Ma'amar, and the second brother, Bi'ah, forbidding her to the
one who made Ma'amar.
(c) We get round the problem that, if that is the case, then the second
brother would not need to have made Bi'ah with the Yevamah; she would be
forbidden to the first brother even if he just made Ma'amar (like the first
one did) - by establishing the Beraisa like Raban Gamliel, who holds 'Ein
Ma'amar Achar Ma'amar', in which case it is only Bi'ah that will forbid her
on the brother who made Ma'amar, and not Ma'amar.
(d) We cannot reject the current contention (to learn the 'Kal va'Chomer'
from Yevamah le'Achim) from Ma'amar, as we just explained. We *do* however,
reject it on the grounds that, even if she cannot become forbidden to the
first brother through the *Ma'amar* of the second one, she will however,
become forbidden if he gave her a Get or performed Chalitzah.
(a) So Rebbi Yochanan tries to establish the case by Sotah, not a Sotah with
whom the husband had relations - because here again, it does not require
Bi'ah to forbid her on the adulterer, seeing as even a Get would do the
trick, or even if he just refused to give her the water to drink (since it
must be given to her via the husband).
(b) Nor can it refer to a Sotah with whom the adulterer had relations, and
who becomes forbidden to her husband - because that is not a light Isur, but
an Isur Eishes Ish (and all the suggestions until now have been ordinary
(c) So Rava and Ravin Amar Rebbi Yochanan finally establish the 'Isur Kal'
by Eishes Ish - which is called an Isur Kal - inasmuch as the one who
forbids her (her husband) does not necessarily forbid her all his life (in
the way that a wife forbids her sister on her husband), seeing as he permits
her to get married by giving her a Get.
(a) Following the Tana Kama's ruling in our Mishnah (regarding the wife who
returned after her husband (based on the witness's testimony that she had
died), had married her sister, Rebbi Yossi states 'Kol she'Posel al-yedei
Acheirim Posel al-yedei Atzmo (ve'Chol she'Ein Posel al-yedei Acheirim Ein
Posel al-yedei Atzmo)' - meaning that in the case when his brother-in-law
(his second wife's husband) arrived too, just as his marriage forbids his
brother-in-law to take back *his wife*, so too, it will forbid him to take
back *his* own wife (mi'de'Rabbanan)?
(b) He cannot mean to say the opposite (that just as his wife is permitted
to him, so too, is his brother-in-law's wife permitted to *his* wife [his
own wife's sister]) - because then he should have said 'Kol she'Ein Posel
al-yedei Atzmo Ein Posel al-yedei Acheirim' (in the *second* half of his
statement and not vice-versa - though this is not clear, because we are
currently discussing the *first* half of his statement).
(c) Rebbi Yossi concludes 've'Chol she'Eino Posel al-yedei Acheirim Eino
Posel al-yedei Atzmo'. According to Rebbi Ami - he is referring to the
Reisha, where he married his sister-in-law through *two* witnesses. Seeing
as there, his brother-in-law is permitted to take his wife back (since she
was an A'nus), Rebbi Yossi agrees with the Tana Kama that he too, is
permitted to take back his (and it is only in the Seifa, which adds the case
of marrying through *one* witness, where his brother-in-law is forbidden to
take back his wife, that he disagrees with him).
(a) According to Rebbi Yitzchak Nafcha, Rebbi Yossi refers to the Seifa (to
when *one* witness testified). 'Ha de'Azli Ishto ve'Giso, Ha de'Azli Arusaso
ve'Giso'. If his sister and brother-in-law were betrothed, then we are
afraid of people assuming that the first Kidushin was made conditionally,
that the condition was not met and that the second marriage was therefore
valid. And when they see the woman leaving the marriage without a Get, they
will extrapolate that a woman may leave a marriage without a Get. This fear
does not exist if they were married, because there is no such thing as a
marriage on condition, as we explained earlier.
(b) Now his statement is clear: 've'Chol she'Eino Posel al-yedei Acheirim' -
when his wife and brother-in-law were originally married, in which case we
permit his brother-in-law to take back his wife upon their return, seeing as
we have nothing to fear, 'Eino Posel al-yedei Atzmo' - he is also permitted
to take back *his* own wife.
(c) The Rabbanan disagree with him in the case of one witness, to forbid his
brother-in-law to take back his wife even if they were previously
*married* - because, according to them, the reason that a woman who married
through one witness is forbidden to return to her husband is due, not to the
fear of what people might say, but because of her carelessness in marrying
without making the necessary enquiries, as we explained earlier.
Consequently, according to them, there is no difference between marriage and
(a) Rav considers a Yevamah like an Eishes Ish. According to Rav Huna - this
refers to a woman whom a man betrothed before going overseas. After the
man's brother, hearing that he had died, performed Yibum with her, his
brother returned. Rav maintains that she has the same Din as a married
woman, and is forbidden to return to him.
(b) Rav can only be speaking about a woman whom the brother had betrothed -
where we are afraid of the unmet condition that people will suspect going on
to assume that the brother's marriage ('Yibum') was therefore valid, and
that the first brother is now marrying Eishes Achiv. Had the first brother
married her however, then everyone would have known that the second marriage
(the 'Yibum') must have been a mistake, in which case there is no room for
the above fear.
(c) Shmuel says 'Einah ke'Eishes Ish', and she is permitted to return to her
husband - because it is unusual for people to think that there must have
been an unfulfilled condition ... .
(d) Rav Yosef initially thinks that Shmuel's ruling here clashes with his
previous statement where he ruled like Rebbi Yossi - who, in the first part
of his statement, does indeed take into account the fear based on the
(a) Abaye gives three possible answers to Rav Yosef's Kashya. Firstly, he
answers by establishing Rebbi Yossi like Rebbi Ami - who is not concerned
about whether there might have been a condition or not, seeing as, in his
opinion, Rebbi Yossi is even strict by 'Ishto ve'Giso' too.
(b) And as for the contradiction in the two rulings, we will answer Shmuel
like this: By the case of Achos Ishto, she is forbidden to return to her
husband - because should his brother-in-law arrive before his own wife, he
will immediately be forbidden to take back his wife, who will require a Get,
so that people should not say that her first husband divorced her, the
second one married her and now she is leaving without a Get (and as for
being Achos Ishto, they will say that her sister died, as the husband indeed
believed). But in the case of Eishes Achiv, as soon as the brother appears,
and takes back his wife, people will not say that he divorced her and the
second one married her (because everyone knows that a brother's divorcee is
forbidden), but that they thought that he had died and that the second
brother's marriage was a mistake (as was indeed the case).
(c) Alternatively, Abaye answers the Kashya even according to Rebbi Yitzchak
Nafcha's explanation - by restricting Shmuel's ruling like Rebbi Yossi, to
the latter part of his statement 've'Chol she'Ein Posel al-yedei Acheirim
Ein Posel al-yedei Atzmo' (where he permits Ishto ve'Giso, even though the
Tana Kama forbids it), but not to the former part 'Kol she'Posel al-yedei
Acheirim Posel al-yedei Atzmo' (where he forbids Arusaso ve'Giso), the
source of our Kashya.
(d) In another alternative, Abaye dismisses Rav Huna's interpretation of the
Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel. He suggests that they argue over Rav
Hamnuna's statement - that a Yevamah who committed adultery with another man
is forbidden to the Yavam.
(a) According to Rav Hamnuna ...
1. ... when Rav says 'Yevamah Harei Hi ke'Eishes Ish' - he means to equate
the Din of a Yevamah who commits adultery le'Shuk with that of an Eishes
Ish, who becomes Pasul through relations with another man.
(b) As a final alternative, Abaye explains the Machlokes with regard to the
Kidushin of another man taking effect on a Yevamah - according to Rav it
does not; according to Shmuel, it does.
2. ... when Shmuel says 'Einah ke'Eishes Ish' - he means that she does not
have the same Din as an Eishes Ish.
(c) True, this dispute was brought above on Daf 92b. In fact however - they
only disputed this point once, and the second occasion is brought based on