ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 97
YEVAMOS 96, 97 - These Dafim have been sponsored through the generous
donation of Reb Uri Wolfson of Yerushalayim, a true Ohev Torah.
(a) Our Mishnah, which equates the Din of a ben Esrim who did not yet bring
signs of Gadlus with that of a ben Tesha, speaks when the ben Esrim *does
not have any signs of S'risus* either; whereas the Beraisa, which states
that a ben Esrim needs only to prove that he has reached the age of twenty,
and he has the Din of a Saris (who is a Gadol) - speaks when he *does*.
***** Hadran Alach ha'Ishah Rabah *****
(b) Rava proves this from the last two words of the statement in the
Beraisa - 've'Hu ha'Saris'.
(c) A person who has neither the signs of a Gadol nor those of a Saris
remains a Katan - until he passes half a life-span (i.e. the age of
(d) Rava advised someone who had reached the age of twenty and had not
brought the signs of Gadlus - to strengthen himself (by eating well), if he
was weak, and to weaken himself (by eating sparsely) if he was strong
(because sometimes, weakness or strength tend to delay the appearance of the
signs of Gadlus).
***** Nos'in al ha'Anusah *****
(a) 'Nos'in al ha'Anusah - means that one is permitted to marry the close
relative (the daughter, sister or mother) of a woman that he raped.
(b) One is however - Chayav for raping one's wife sister, daughter or
(c) The Tana Kama permits a person to marry a woman who was raped by his
father or by his son - Rebbi Yehudah forbids the former.
(d) These three Halachos, besides applying to a woman who was raped - also
apply to one who was seduced).
(a) We reconcile our Mishnah (which permits a man to marry the relatives of
a woman whom he raped) with the Beraisa, which forbids a man to marry the
relatives of the woman whom he is purported to have raped - by establishing
our Mishnah mi'd'Oraysa, and the Beraisa mi'de'Rabbanan.
(b) When the Tana of our Mishnah says 'Nos'in' (Lechatchilah) - he speaks
after the death of the Anusah or the Mefutah (where there is nothing to
decree, because the suspicion that he may rape or seduce her after marrying
her relative [the reason for the decree] no longer applies).
(c) From the fact that, by all the blood-relatives listed in Kedoshim, the
Torah uses a Lashon of 'Shechivah', whereas by those relationships that
result through marriage, it uses a Lashon 'Kichah' - the Tana of the Beraisa
learns that, in the latter case, the relatives only become forbidden through
marriage (which 'Kichah' implies), but not through rape or seduction.
(d) Rav Papa asked Abaye from 'Achoso', where the Torah uses the Lashon of
'Kichah'. Abaye replied - that wherever the Torah writes a Lashon of
'Shechivah', it obviously *does not require marriage* to forbid the
relatives. But where it uses a Lashon of 'Lekichah', then it *does*,
provided it *is appropriate; where it is *not* (such as by Achoso since
Kidushin does not take effect by her), then it clearly refers to 'Shechivah'
(despite the fact that it used a Lashon of 'Lekichah').
(a) Rava learns 'Nos'in al ha'Anusah' from a contradiction between two
Pesukim. He infers from the Pasuk "Ervas bas Bincha O bas Bitcha Lo
Segaleh" - 'Ha, bas B'nah Didah u'bas Bitah Didah, Gali', which clashes with
the other Pasuk "Ervas Ishah u'Vitah Lo Segalei, es bas B'na ve'es bas Bitah
(b) He reconciles the two Pesukim - by establishing the former Pasuk by rape
or seduction, and the latter by marriage.
(c) He knows that the reverse is not the case (that rape or seduction
forbids the relatives, but marriage does not) - because the Torah uses the
Lashon 'She'er' (a term that pertains to a relative through marriage, but
not by rape) by one of the cases of blood-relations (his father's sister).
See also Maharsha.
(a) Rebbi Yehudah learns from the Pasuk "Lo Yikach Ish es Eishes Aviv,
*ve'Lo Yegaleh K'naf Aviv*" that Anusas Aviv is forbidden. He know that the
Pasuk is speaking about Anusas Aviv - because the previous Pasuk speaks
(b) The Rabbanan disagree with Rebbi Yehudah's source on the grounds that
the phrase "Lo Yikach Ish es Eishes Aviv" interrupts between the two
phrases, so that they are not really Samuch. In fact, they Darshen the Pasuk
like Rav Anan Amar Shmuel - who establishes it by the Shomeres Yavam of his
father. "K'naf Aviv" - means 'K'naf ha'Ra'uy le'Aviv'.
(c) We need a Pasuk for that, despite the fact that she is Dodaso (his
uncle's wife) anyway - to make him transgress *two* La'avin.
(d) He might even transgress a third La'av, because of Yevamah le'Shuk. We
reject this contention however - by establishing our Pasuk after his
father's death, in which case, he will transgress only *two* La'avin.
(a) To demonstrate to the Minim that the Torah contains all forms of
Chochmah (see Tosfos DH 'Ach' and Hagahos Maharshal), Chazal inserted a
number of riddles into the Sugya.
1. 'He is my paternal father as well as my mother's husband' - pertains to
the case of a woman speaking to her paternal brother, who had now married
her mother, whom her father had raped but not married. This case cannot go
according to Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah - who forbids a man to marry the
woman his father raped.
(b) The first of these cases pertain to a Jew - because it is possible to
establish it be'Heter, the others to a Nochri - which can only occur
2. 'He is my brother and my son. I am the sister of the child whom I carry
on my shoulders' - pertains to a Nochri who had relations with his daughter,
who bore him a son (to whom she passes this comment).
3. ... 'Good morning to you my son, I am your sister's daughter' - pertains
to a Nochri who had relations with his daughter's daughter, who bore him a
son (to whom she is talking).
4. ... 'The child I am carrying on my shoulders is my son and I am his
brother's daughter' - to the case of a Nochri who had relations with his
son's daughter, who bore him a son (to whom she now passes this comment).
This riddle was posed to the workers who watered the fields (see also Tosfos
1. ... 'I lodge a complaint about my (maternal) brother who is both my
father and my husband, as well as the son of both my husband and the husband
of my mother. And I am his wife's daughter, who refuses to give a piece of
bread to the orphaned children of his daughter - pertains to a woman who was
born from a Nochri who had relations with his mother. Then both he and his
father had relations with *her*, and after she bore children to the latter,
he died (and it is to her father that she is speaking).
(d) This last case is possible even if all those involved are Jews - where
Shimon married one of Reuven (his brother)'s daughters, and Levi (a third
brother)'s son married the other sister. It is Shimon's son who says to
Levi's grandson 'You and I are the sons of two sisters; your father and I
are the sons of two brothers, and your mother and I are the children of two
2. ... 'You and I are brother and sister; your father and I are brother and
sister, and your mother and I are sisters - pertains to a woman, whose
father had relations with his mother from whom she and a sister were born.
Then he had relations with her sister, from whom the son to whom she is
talking was born.
Note: It will help to understand the following Sugya if one bears in mind
that as far as the father is concerned, it is his status at the time of the
baby's *conception* that will determine the baby's status, whereas with the
mother, the criterion is what she is at the time that the baby is *born*.
(a) If the sons of a Nochris converted together with her, they perform
neither Yibum nor Chalitzah with each other's wives - because they need to
be *paternal* brothers in order to perform Yibum, and a Nochri does not have
Yichus (in this regard), because the Pasuk writes in Yechezkel "ve'Zarmas
Susim Zarmasam" (declaring their Zera to be like that of horses).
(b) The same Din will apply - if one of them was conceived before the
conversion but born after it, and the other one was both born and conceived
(c) If a Shifchah together with her sons converted in the same
circumstances - the Din will be exactly the same as a Nochris who converted
with her two sons.
(a) Rav Acha bar Ya'akov permitted the sons of Yudan, a Shifchah
Meshuchreres, to marry each other's wives. When Rav informed him that Rav
Sheishes forbade it - he retorted 'Rav Sheishes forbids it and I permit it'!
In the second Lashon, Rav Acha bar Ya'akov is even more lenient. There - he
permits even maternal brothers to marry each other's wives.
(b) Both Rav Sheishes and Rav Acha bar Ya'akov agree that paternal (but not
maternal) brothers are permitted (as we explained in our Mishnah). In the
first Lashon, they also agree that maternal brothers are forbidden - because
one might otherwise become confused with a Yisrael, and permit it there too.
(c) Chazal decreed by maternal brothers, because we know for sure who their
mother is - but not by paternal ones, whose fathers are doubtful.
(d) Their Machlokes in the first Lashon is - by full brothers. Rav Sheishes
stresses the fact that they are after all, maternal brothers, and the decree
applies; whereas Rav Acha bar Ya'akov maintains that since they have the
same father, that is what will stick in people's minds, in which case there
is no room for a decree.
(a) Our Mishnah 'ha'Giyores she'Nisgayru Banehah Imah, Lo Choltzin ve'Lo
Meyabmin' seems to pose a Kashya on the second Lashon of Rav Acha bar
Ya'akov - inasmuch as we assume ' Lo Choltzin ve'Lo Meyabmin' to mean that
they are forbidden (since they are maternal brothers) because of Eishes Ach
(b) This Kashya is strengthened by the word 'Afilu' ('*Afilu* Horaso shel
Rishon she'Lo bi'Kedushah ... ve'ha'Sheini Horaso ve'Leidaso bi'Kedushah') -
meaning that, even though the conception of the first one was she'Lo
bi'Kedushah and that of the second one, bi'Kedushah, (giving the appearance
of being two separate mothers), it is nevertheless forbidden.
(c) According to Rav Acha bar Ya'akov, who permits them in all cases (and
who interprets 'Lo Choltzin ve'Lo Meyabmin' to mean that Yibum and Chalitzah
are not necessary) - 'Afilu' implies: although they were both born
bi'Kedushah (and we might confuse them with Jewish maternal brothers), they
are nevertheless permitted without Yibum or Chalitzah - see Rashash.
(d) In the second Lashon, we try to prove Rav Acha bar Ya'akov's second
Lashon from 'Afilu', which implies that even though they were both born
bi'Kedushah, they are permitted (without Yibum ... ). And we refute this
proof - on the grounds that 'Afilu' implies that, even though one of them
was conceived she'Lo bi'Kedushah, and the other one, bi'Kedushah, they are
nevertheless forbidden (like we learned at first in the first Lashon).
(a) The Tana of the Beraisa forbids (or does not obligate) two twin brother
converts to perform either Chalitzah or Yibum with each other's wives. He
speaks specifically about twins - because they are definitely paternal
(b) They are not Chayav because of Eishes Ach (even if they are maternal
brothers too) - because of the principle 'Ger she'Nisgayer, ke'Katan
(c) If they were ...
1. ... born (but not conceived) after their parents' conversion - then they
are Chayav because of Eishes Ach (but will remain Patur from Yibum and
Chalitzah, because we go after the mother and not after the father, as we
(d) We refute the inference from the Reisha of the Beraisa (which serves as
a Kashya on Rav Acha) 'Ein Chayavin Mishum Eishes Ach', Chiyuva Leika, Ha
Isura Ika - by pointing out that the Tana writes 'Ein Chayavin ... ' there
(and not 'Mutarin') only because it needs to write 'Aval Chayavin ... ' in
2. ... both conceived and born after the conversion - they have the full Din
of two brothers.