ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 118
YEVAMOS 116-119 - have been sponsored through the generous contribution of
Mr. Uri Wolfson and family
(a) We have learned that a woman is not believed to permit her Tzarah to
marry. The reason that, in the Reisha of our Mishnah, the second Tzarah
needs to contradict the first one and testify that her husband did not die,
in order to be forbidden to marry, is not to preclude a case where she is
silent - but for the Chidush of 'Lo Meis', to teach us that, despite the
fact that she is clearly coming to upset her Tzarah, we do not say that
really, her husband *did* die, only she said that he did not, in order to
forbid her Tzarah to remarry (even if it meant forbidding herself, too).
(b) We learn that a person will give a false testimony to implicate others,
even though it means implicating oneself in the process - from Shimshon who,
in Sefer Shoftim, declared "Tamos Nafshi im P'lishtim" as he pulled the
pillars, bringing the house down on the P'lishtim and on himself.
(a) Rebbi Meir argues with Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon in the second case
in the Mishnah (when one of the Tzaros testified that their husband had
died, and the other, that he was killed). Rebbi Elazar (ben P'das)
establishes the Reisha, where there is no Machlokes, and where the Tana
permits the Tzarah who says that he died, to marry - like Rebbi Yehudah and
(b) According to Rebbi Yochanan - even Rebbi Meir will agree in the Reisha,
that she is permitted to marry, because 'Lo Meis' is not considered evidence
at all (since the Rabbanan believed the one who said 'Meis').
(c) We establish the Seifa of the Mishnah 'Ishah Omeres Meis, ve'Ishah
Omeres Lo Meis, Lo Tinasei' - a S'tam Mishnah, like Rebbi Meir (according to
Rebbi Elazar). According to Rebbi Yochanan, who will be the author?
(a) Rebbi Tarfon even permits the woman who insisted that their husband was
still alive, to eat Terumah - because we might have thought that, even
though we do not believe her Tzarah (who testified that he had died)
regarding allowing her to marry (le'Kula), we will perhaps believe her
regarding disqualifying her from eating Terumah 'le'Chumra).
(b) Rebbi Akiva says - that we do accept the Tzarah's evidence with regard
(c) Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva engage in the same dispute with regard to a
woman who testifies that her husband died first and then her father-in-law.
In spite of having already permitted the Tzarah to continue eating Terumah
in the case of the Tzarah, Rebbi Tarfon nevertheless found it necessary to
repeat it in the case of the mother-in-law (where the hatred is less acute
due to the fact that it is not personal like it is by the Tzarah, as we
explained above). Perhaps here, we will not discredit her testimony
completely, and at least believe her le'Chumra.
(d) And in spite of having refused to believe the woman who testified that
her husband died, in the case of her mother-in-law, Rebbi Akiva nevertheless
found it necessary to repeat it in the case of the Tzarah - where we might
otherwise have thought that he will agree with Rebbi Tarfon that the one
Tzarah (who hates the other one for personal reasons), will not be believed
at all, even with regard to Terumah.
(a) The Mishnah on Amud b. rules, that if a woman testifies that she bore
her first son overseas, and that after *he* died, her husband died too, she
is believed and is permitted to perform Yibum - because she is merely
corroborating her Chazakah (and she could just as well have remained
(b) If, in the same circumstances, she inverts the order of her son's and
husband's deaths - she is not believed and she cannot perform Yibum, though
she is obligated to perform Chalitzah.
(c) We infer from the Lashon 've'Chosheshin *li'D'varehah*' - that we only
believe a woman regarding herself, but not regarding her Tzarah, even
le'Chumra (to require Chalitzah).
(d) Abaye goes on to prove from there - that the Halachah is like Rebbi
Tarfon, who permits the Tzarah to continue eating Terumah, in spite of her
Tzarah's testimony (seeing as it is a 'Machlokes, ve'Achar-Kach S'tam' -
which is generally Halachah).
(a) According to Rebbi Tarfon - if a man betrothed one of five women, but
who does not recall which one, if each of them claims to be the one whom he
betrothed (and he does not want to marry all five) - he must give each one a
Get, but he pays only one Kesubah.
(b) Rebbi Akiva disagrees. In his opinion - he must pay each one a Kesubah?
(c) They engage in exactly the same dispute regarding theft, the case
being - if a man stole from one of five people. He does not remember from
which one, and each one claims that he is the owner.
(a) We can infer from the fact that the Tana mentions specifically ...
The Tana now finds it necessary to mention both cases (Kidesh and Gazal). He
needs to mention ...
1. ... 'Kidesh' (which infers Kidushei Kesef) in the Reisha - that had he
betrothed one of five women with Bi'ah (which is humiliating [should the
betrothal turn out to be invalid]), Rebbi Tarfon would agree that he must
pay each woman a Kesubah.
(b) According to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, the dispute between Rebbi Tarfon
and Rebbi Akiva is by Bi'ah in the Reisha, and by Lakach in the Seifa. In a
case of Kidesh or Lakach - even Rebbi Akiva will agree that he only needs to
pay one Kesubah and one payment (respectively).
2. ... 'Gazal' (and not 'Lakach') in the Seifa - that, had he bought from
one of five men (where no sin is involved), then even Rebbi Akiva would
agree that he only needs to put down one payment.
(c) From the words of Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, we can infer what the Tana
Kama of the Beraisa holds. According to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, our Tana
should have mentioned 'Ba'al' in the Reisha together with 'Gazal' of the
Seifa - according to the Tana Kama, he should have mentioned 'Lakach' in the
Seifa together with 'Kidesh' of the Reisha.
(d) We establish the Mishnah like Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar. 'Kidesh' does not
refer to Kidushei Kesef (as we mistakenly believed until now), but to
1. ... Kidesh - to demonstrate the strength of Rebbi Akiva (who holds that
Chazal penalized him even though he only transgressed an Isur de'Rabbanan
(betrothing with Bi'ah - as we learned above on Daf 52a.)
2. ... Gazal - to demonstrate the strength of Rebbi Tarfon, who does not
penalize him, even though he transgressed an Isur d'Oraysa.
(a) The Tana of our Mishnah states that if a woman who travelled overseas
with her husband and son, returns with the news that first her husband died
and then her son, she is believed, but not if she inverts the order -
because, whereas in the former case, she is merely corroborating the
Chazakah (that she is Mutar le'Shuk), in the Seifa, she is contradicting the
Chazakah (in permitting herself to perform Yibum - though she is obligated
to perform Chalitzah, because, due her statement, she created the
prohibition of marrying le'Shuk without it, and she must bow adhere to it
[though Rav Nachman in the Sugya seems to explain the Mishnah differently -
see 11a. 1.]).
(b) If, she left home without children, and she then returns with the news
that she bore a son overseas, but that first ...
1. ... he died and then her husband - she is believed (and is permitted to
perform Yibum), because she corroborates the Chazakah.
(c) If she testifies that her mother-in-law bore a son (a Yavam) overseas,
and that ...
2. ... her husband had died, and then, her son - she is not believed, though
she does have to perform Chalitzah.
1. ... her husband died first and then her son - she is believed, because of
the principle 'ha'Peh she'Asar Hu ha'Peh she'Hitir' (in the same statement
as she forbade, she permitted), and she is merely corroborating her original
2. ... her son died first and then her husband - she is also believed.
(a) A woman is not believed to testify that her Yavam died, so that she may
marry le'Shuk, or that her sister died so that she may marry her husband.
(b) Nor is a man believed to testify that his brother died so that he may
perform Yibum with his wife, or that his wife died so that he may marry her
(a) A man cannot normally appoint a Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah - because the
moment the Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah (who acts on behalf of the woman) receives
the Get, she is divorced, even though she is not present, and seeing as a
Get is normally to the woman's disadvantage (because she loses various
monetary benefits), we apply the principle 'Ein Chavin le'Adam Ela
(b) Rava asked Rav Nachman whether, if a man who had a brother, appointed a
Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah, the Get would be valid. It might be ...
1. ... valid - because of the strong likelihood of her disliking the Yavam.
(c) By giving her a Get through a Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah - she will be
divorced immediately (as we explained earlier), in which case, should her
husband die (a fact which he is clearly anticipating), she will be spared
having to perform Yibum.
2. ... invalid - because sometimes, she is fond of him.
(a) Rav Nachman answered him from our Mishnah. He proves from the Mishnah
where, when she left ...
1. ... with a child, the Tana said 'Choletzes' and not 'Tinasei' - that,
when she obligates herself to perform Yibum, we do not take for granted that
she is lying, because she is fond of the Yavam.
(b) Based on these two rulings, Rav Nachman resolved Rava's She'eilah (with
regard to a man who has a brother, who appoints a Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah and
dies) - by ruling that, here too, she requires Chalitzah (because it is
neither certain that it is to her advantage nor that it is to her
2. ... without a child, he said 'Choletzes' and not 'Tisyabem' - that, when
she exempts herself from Yibum, we do not take for granted that she is
lying, because she dislikes him.
(c) When Ravina asked Rava whether, if a man who is currently quarreling
with his wife, appoints a Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah, it is considered to her
advantage or to her disadvantage, Rav Nachman replied with a principle from
Resh Lakish - that a woman will do anything to avoid remaining single and
(d) Abaye says that a woman whose husband is as small as an ant, proudly
places her seat among the marrieds.
(a) Rav Papa says in this regard - that if a man whose profession is combing
wool calls a woman to come and sit at his gate, she will (because she wants
to get married at all costs).
***** Hadran Alach ha'Ishah Shalom *****
(b) Rav Ashi says in this regard - that she will even marry a man whose
family is stigmatized, just in order to be married, and she will not even
ask him for a lentils.
(c)The last word however, goes to the Tana of the Beraisa. He says - that a
woman who marries any of the above will commit adultery, whilst insisting
that her children are her husband's.