REVIEW QUESTIONS ON GEMARA AND RASHI
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 88
YEVAMOS 86-90 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi
publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.
(a) We suggest that accepting the testimony of one witness to permit a woman
to remarry is a S'vara. Why is it obvious that a piece of fat which is Safek
Cheilev, Safek Shuman becomes permitted if someone testifies that it is
(b) On what grounds do we reject the comparison between the two cases? Why
should the woman nevertheless remain forbidden?
(c) What will be the Din if one witness testifies that a piece of fat that
we know to be Cheilev, is Shuman?
(d) And on what grounds do we reject the comparison of our case to *that*
(a) So we try and compare our case to Tevel, Hekdesh and Konamos.
Why is a
person believed to say that his Tevel has been rectified?
(b) Why might he not be believed if he testifies that someone else's Tevel
has been rectified?
(c) Why will he be believed if he says that his Hekdesh which was ...
(d) What will be the Din if he testifies that someone else's animal that was
Kedushas ha'Guf is now Chulin, because the owner had the Hekdesh nullified?
- ... Kedushas Damim is now Chulin?
- ... Kedushas ha'Guf (Mizbei'ach) is now Chulin?
(a) What are Konamos?
(b) What is the meaning of ...
(c) Would the owner be believed to say that the object was no longer
forbidden, were we to hold ...
- ... 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos'?
- ... 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos'?
(d) Assuming that we hold 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos' would he be believed to
say that someone else's object is no longer forbidden?
- ... 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos?
- ... 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos'?
(a) Then on what basis do all the above Mishnahs accept the testimony of one
witness, in spite of the fact that it does not lie in his power to rectify
matters, and it is a Davar she'be'Ervah (a matter concerning marriage)?
(b) And on what basis did Chazal take such a lenient view with regard to
(c) Do the Chachamim have the power to override Torah law in this manner
(see Tosfos DH 'Mitoch' and Tosfos Yeshanim 'Mishum')?
(a) How did the people of Eretz Yisrael react when they heard of Rav's
ruling that if the woman remarried on the basis of the testimony of *two*
witnesses, and the husband returned, then she may remain with her second
Answers to questions
(b) How do we justify Rav's statement?
(c) How do we establish Rav, in order to differentiate between one witness
(in which case she must leave the second marriage) and two (when she may
(d) On what do we base the phenomenon of not recognizing a close
(a) What is the penalty for living with a Safek Eishes Ish?
(b) Then how can Rav permit the woman who after all, is a Safek Eishes Ish,
to remain with the second man?
(c) Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yossi in a Beraisa, rules that if two witnesses
testify that a woman's husband died or that he divorced her, and two other
witnesses testify that he did not, then, even after the woman subsequently
marries one of the first pair, she is forbidden to remain with him.
do the Rabbanan say?
(d) Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yossi concedes that if they were already married,
she may remain with him.
What then, is Rav's Chidush, according to ...
- ... the first Lashon?
- ... the second Lashon?
(a) What does the Beraisa learn from the Pasuk in Emor "ve'Kidashto"? What
is the case?
(b) Why must the Tana be referring to a case of Safek (as above) where she
married one of her witnesses?
(c) Initially, in order to reconcile this Beraisa with Rav, we differentiate
between ordinary Arayos and Isurei Kehunah, where the Torah is more
stringent. Alternatively, how do we interpret 'Dafno' differently, in order
to avoid differentiating between them?
(d) In the third answer, we establish the Beraisa like Rebbi Menachem
What does he say? How does this reconcile Rav with the
(a) Rav Ashi offers a new slant to the Sugya by reinterpreting Rav's
statement 'Lo Seitzei'.
How does he now explain it?
(b) But did he not already teach us that, when he ruled like the Tana of our
Mishnah who said 'Niseis she'Lo bi'R'shus, Muteres Lachzor Lo'?
(a) According to Shmuel, when our Mishnah rules 'Teiztei', that is only as
long as she does not contradict the witness, but if she does, she may remain
with her second husband.
How do we know that the Tana is talking about one
witness, and not two?
(b) Why is a second witness not believed to contradict the testimony of the
first witness who said that her husband died? What principle did Ula teach
in this regard?
(c) So, according to Shmuel, we establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Nechemyah
in a Beraisa. What does Rebbi Nechemyah say? How does this explain our
Mishnah (see Hagahos ha'Gra)?
(d) According to the second Lashon, Rebbi Nechemyah speaks when the first
witness was a woman.
In which point does the second Lashon argue with the
(a) It is obvious that the return of the woman's husband automatically
invalidates the second marriage.
What reason does Rav Huna give to explain
why our Mishnah requires a Get from the second man?
(b) How do we initially explain the Seifa, which permits the woman to return
to her husband if the second man only betrothed (but did not marry) her? Why
are we not worried there too, that people might say that a betrothed woman
does not require a Get?
(c) How can the Tana permit a man to take back his wife, once she has been
betrothed to somebody else?
(d) On what grounds do we refute the current interpretation of the Seifa
(that she does indeed require a Get)? Perhaps a Get mi'de'Rabbanan of this
nature will not invalidate a woman from the Kehunah?
(a) So how do we finally explain the Seifa? Why *do* we permit the betrothed
woman to return to her husband without a Get from the second man?
Answers to questions
(b) Then why does she require a Get in the Reisha, seeing as there no
logical reason to differentiate between marriage and betrothal in this