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1)

(a) We learn that having relations with a wife's sister does not forbid his wife to him from "Osah". Seeing as the Torah does not specifically forbid her, why do we need a Pasuk for that? Why would we otherwise have thought that she is forbidden?

(b) According to Rebbi Yehudah, Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that relations with one's mother-in-law forbids his wife to him. They argue over our case (whether he becomes forbidden through relations with his wife's sister. Beis Hillel permit it because of "Osah".
What is Beis Shamai's reason?

(c) According to Rebbi Yossi, Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel both agree that relations with his wife's sister do not forbid her to him.
Then what is their Machlokes?

(a) In what way does a man who marries a woman forbid his wife more than she forbids him?

(b) How does Rebbi Yossi extrapolate from there that if a man has relations with his wife's sister be'Shogeg, she remains permitted to him?

(c) How does Rebbi Ami Amar Resh Lakish derive Rebbi Yehudah's opinion (that relations with a man's mother-in-law forbids his wife to him) from the Pasuk in Kedoshim "ba'Eish Yisrefu Oso *ve'Es'hen*"?

(a) What did Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel do with that man who had relations with his mother-in-law?

(b) What did he mean when he told him that if not for Shmuel, he would have forbidden him permanently? What did Shmuel say?

(a) We learned above that, if not for the Pasuk "Osah" we would have forbidden a woman to her husband on the basis of his having had relations with her sister, from a 'Kal va'Chomer'. Rav Chisda initially learns the 'Kal va'Chomer' from Machzir G'rushaso.
What makes Machzor G'rushaso an Isur Kal? To whom is she forbidden?

(b) On what two scores do we reject this 'Kal va'Chomer'? Which two stringencies does Machzor G'rushaso have over Achos Ishto?

(c) So Resh Lakish learns it from a Yevamah. This cannot mean a Yevamah who had relations with someone from the Shuk, for two reasons, one of them because, unlike Achos Ishto, where the wife herself did not sin, she did. What other stringency does Yevamah le'Shuk have over Achos Ishto?

(a) So we establish the 'Kal va'Chomer' from Yevamah le'Achim. It is obvious that this cannot be referring to a Yevamah who had relations with someone else (like Rav Hamnuna, who forbids her to the brothers).
Why not?

(b) What then, must be the case of Yevamah?

(c) How do we get round the problem that, if that was the case, then the second brother would not need to have made Bi'ah with the Yevamah; she would be forbidden to the first brother even if he just made Ma'amar (like the first one did)?

(d) We cannot reject the current contention (to learn the 'Kal va'Chomer' from Yevamah le'Achim) from Ma'amar, as we just explained. On what grounds *do* we reject it?

(a) So Rebbi Yochanan tries to establish the case by Sotah. Why can this not mean a Sotah with whom the husband had relations?

(b) And why can it also not refer to a Sotah with whom the adulterer had relations?

(c) So Rava and Ravin Amar Rebbi Yochanan finally establish the 'Isur Kal' by Eishes Ish.
In which respect is Eishes Ish called an Isur Kal?

7)

(a) Following the Tana Kama's ruling in our Mishnah (regarding the wife who returned after her husband (based on the testimony that she had died), had married her sister, Rebbi Yossi states 'Kol she'Posel al-yedei Acheirim Posel al-yedei Atzmo (ve'Chol she'Ein Posel al-yedei Acheirim Ein Posel al-yedei Atzmo)'.
What does he mean by that?

(b) How do we know that he does not mean to say the opposite (that just as his wife is permitted to him, so too, is his brother-in-law's wife permitted to *his* wife [his own wife's sister])?

(c) Rebbi Yossi concludes 've'Chol she'Eino Posel al-yedei Acheirim Eino Posel al-yedei Atzmo'.
What is he referring to, according to Rebbi Ami? In which case does he agree with the Tana Kama that he is permitted to return to his wife?

(a) According to Rebbi Yitzchak Nafcha, Rebbi Yossi refers to the Seifa (to when *one* witness testified). 'Ha de'Azli Ishto ve'Giso, Ha de'Azli Arusaso ve'Giso'.
What is the difference whether his sister and brother-in-law were only betrothed or married?

(b) How does this explain Rebbi Yossi's statement 've'Chol she'Eino Posel al-yedei Acheirim Eino Posel al-yedei Atzmo'?

(c) And why do the Rabbanan disagree with him by one witness, to forbid his brother-in-law to take back his wife even if they were previously *married*?

(a) Rav considers a Yevamah like an Eishes Ish.
How does Rav Huna explain this?

(b) Why must Rav be speaking about a woman whom the brother had betrothed but not married?

(c) Shmuel says 'Einah ke'Eishes Ish'.
Why is that?

(d) Why does Rav Yosef initially think that Shmuel's ruling here clashes with his previous statement where he ruled like Rebbi Yossi?

(a) Abaye gives three possible answers to Rav Yosef's Kashya.
How does he answer the Kashya by establishing Rebbi Yossi like Rebbi Ami interpreted it?

(b) How will Shmuel then explain the difference between the case of Achos Ishto, where, according to Rebbi Yossi, she is forbidden to return to return to her husband, and that of Eishes Achiv, where she is permitted?

(c) And how does Abaye answer the Kashya even according to Rebbi Yitzchak Nafcha's explanation?

(d) In another alternative, Abaye dismisses Rav Huna's interpretation of the Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel. He suggests that they argue over Rav Hamnuna's ruling with regard to a Yevamah who committed adultery with another man.
What does Rav Hamnuna say in this regard?

(a) According to Rav Hamnuna, what does ...

1. ... Rav now mean when he says 'Yevamah Harei Hi ke'Eishes Ish'?
2. ... Shmuel mean when he says 'Einah ke'Eishes Ish'?

(b) As a final alternative, Abaye explains the Machlokes with regard to Kidushin taking effect on a Yevamah.
What do Rav and Shmuel respectively hold?

(c) But did they not already dispute this issue (on Daf 92b.)?

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