THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
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Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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ZEVACHIM 2-4 - Dedicated to the leaders and participants in the Dafyomi
shiurim at the Young Israel of New Rochelle, by Andy & Nancy Neff
1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "SHINUY BA'ALIM" AND "SHINUY KODESH"
QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that Shinuy Kodesh is more severe than Shinuy
Ba'alim because it applies to all four of the Avodos -- Shechitah, Kabalah,
Holachah, and Zerikah, while Shinuy Ba'alim does not apply to all four
Avodos. RASHI explains that when a Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim is
meaningless except when the Kohen has intention to perform the *Zerikah* for
a person other than the owner of the Korban. The reason for this is because
the owner of the Korban relates to his Korban only insofar as he receives
Kaparah, or fulfills his pledge, through the valid Zerikah of the blood of
the Korban. Therefore, having in mind that the Shechitah, Kabalah, or
Holachah is being done for a different person has no effect on the Korban.
What does the Gemara mean, then, when it brings verses to show that that
Shinuy Ba'alim *is* considered an invalidating thought in any of the four
Avodos? Rashi explains that the Gemara means that Shinuy Ba'alim is
considered an invalidating thought when the Kohen slaughters the animal with
intention to perform the Zerikah for a different person (but not with
intention that the Shechitah is being performed for a different person). It
is in this sense that the Gemara states that Shinuy Ba'alim does not apply
to all four Avodos, since it is relevant only to thoughts involving Zerikah.
The Gemara makes a similar statement with regard to the Chumra of Shinuy
Kodesh in Pesachim (60b).
We find one more place where the Gemara alludes to this difference between
Shinuy Kodesh and Shinuy Ba'alim. In the Gemara later (9b), Rebbi Yochanan
asserts that if a person slaughters a Korban with the proper intention for
the Shechitah, but with intention -- at the time of the Shechitah -- to
perform the Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah, this is considered a Machshavah she'Lo
Lishmah. The Gemara initially says that Rebbi Yochanan derives this law from
the laws of Pigul, wherein a person who slaughters a Korban with intention
of doing the Zerikah after the proper time has passed ("Chutz l'Zmano")
invalidates the Korban, making it Pasul. In the Gemara later (10a), Rav Ashi
finds another source to teach that thinking, during Shechitah, about doing
the Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah will be considered a Machshavah she'Lo Lishmah.
He says that this Halachah can be learned from a Kal v"Chomer: if we find
that when one does Shechitah with intent for a different owner the Korban is
not considered she'Lo Lishmah, yet when he does Zerikah with intent that the
Zerikah is being done for a different owner, it is considered she'Lo
Lishmah, then certainly with regard to Shinuy Kodesh, where we find that
when one does the Shechitah with intent for a different Korban it is
considered to be she'Lo Lishmah, then certainly if one does the Shechitah
with intention to do the Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah, the Korban is considered to
be she'Lo Lishmah. It is evident from the Gemara there that the laws of a
Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim is different from Shinuy Kodesh.
The RAMBAM (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 13:1 and 15:1) writes the laws of
Shinuy Kodesh and Shinuy Ba'alim, but in no place does he mention any
distinction between the two. The MISHNEH L'MELECH (15:1) asks that the
Rambam seems to contradict the Gemaras mentioned above. How are we to
understand our Gemara according to the ruling of the Rambam?
(a) The ME'IRI in Pesachim (60b) writes that it seems that the Rambam
understands that the Sugya here in Zevachim is not followed as the Halachah.
Why, though, should it not be the Halachah? On the contrary, our Gemara
implies that it *is* the Halachah, since the Gemara does not mention that
this Chumra of Shinuy Kodesh is "Lav Davka" as it mentions with regard to
the other two Chumros of Shinuy Kodesh!
The KEREN ORAH (10a) points out that there is a similar Sugya in the
Yerushalmi in Pesachim (5:2), where the Yerushalmi also looks for a source
that it is considered she'Lo Lishmah when a person slaughters a Korban in
order to do Zerikah for the sake of a different Korban. The Yerushalmi,
however, does not make the simple Kal v'Chomer that Rav Ashi makes in our
Gemara in order to prove that it is she'Lo Lishmah from Shinuy Ba'alim. This
implies that, at least according to the Yerushalmi, Shinuy Ba'alim is the
same as Shinuy Kodesh and is not limited to doing Shechitah with intention
to do Zerikah for another person. Perhaps the Rambam is following the view
of the Yerushalmi that argues with the Bavli (as we find that the Rambam
sometimes follows the Yerushalmi and not the Bavli). In addition, it is
possible that in the Rambam's Girsa of the Gemara, the Gemara here does not
specify which of the two Chumras of Shinuy Kodesh are "Lav Davka." Perhaps
the Rambam learns that the Chumra that Shinuy Kodesh applies to four Avodos
is "Lav Davka," and that in truth both types of Shinuy apply to all four
(b) Other Acharonim attempt to show that whether or not Shinuy Ba'alim
applies the same way as Shinuy Kodesh might be the subject of a Machlokes
even in the Bavli itself. The SEFAS EMES (7a) and the CHAFETZ CHAIM (in
ZEVACH TODAH, 7a) suggest that the Rambam might have learned that this
Halachah depends on the Machlokes between Rava and Rav Chisda in that
Gemara. The KEREN ORAH (4b) shows another Safek in the Bavli, in the Gemara
here, upon which this Halachah might depend. The Chafetz Chaim concludes,
however, that it is odd for the Gemara to state this Halachah regarding
Shinuy Ba'alim as though it is unanimously accepted, if in fact it is
actually the subject of a Machlokes elsewhere and is not followed as the
(c) The CHAFETZ CHAIM in ZEVACH TODAH later (10a) suggests that there are
two types of Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim. A Kohen can slaughter a Korban
thinking that the Shechitah is for another person other than the owner, or a
Kohen can slaughter a Korban thinking that the Korban *belongs* to a person
other than the owner. The Gemara says that a Shinuy Ba'alim during Shechitah
is acceptable only when it is the first type of Shinuy Ba'alim -- when the
Kohen slaughters the Korban with intent that the Shechitah should be for
another person, but the Kohen knows that the Korban belongs to the first
person. In contrast, if the Kohen slaughters the Korban with intent that the
Korban belongs to another person, then the Korban indeed will be considered
she'Lo Lishmah, because it is evident that the Kohen -- who has in mind that
the Korban belongs to another person -- will also perform the Zerikah for
that other person. Thus, it is as if the Kohen had in mind to perform
Zerikah for the other person as well.
Accordingly, the Gemara here and later (10a) may be referring to the first
type of Shinuy Ba'alim, and it is saying that this type of Shinuy Ba'alim is
not considered a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah at the time of Shechitah.
However, the Rambam -- who seems to equate Shinuy Kodesh with Shinuy
Ba'alim -- may be referring to the other type of Machshavah of Shinuy
Ba'alim, where the Kohen has in mind to bring the Korban for another person
(and not just to perform the Shechitah for another person) at the time of
Shechitah. However, the Chafetz Chaim concludes that if this is the way the
Rambam is learning, then the Rambam still should have mentioned that there
is another type of Shinuy Ba'alim that does not apply to Shechitah.
RAV SHACH zt'l in AVI EZRI (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 15:1) and the EVEN
HA'AZEL (end of 13:1) make a similar suggestion. They add that even if the
Kohen slaughters the Korban for the sake of a person other than the owner,
it is considered she'Lo Lishmah, because we assume that he probably intends
to perform the Zerikah for the other person as well. They suggest that the
Gemara later (10a) does not mean that Shechitah done for a different person
is *not* considered she'Lo Lishmah. Rather, it means that it would not have
been considered she'Lo Lishmah had it not been for the fact that the Kohen
intends to do the Zerikah for a different person as well.
However, they have difficulty explaining our Gemara based on this approach.
Why is Shinuy Kodesh considered more Chamur than Shinuy Ba'alim?
(d) Perhaps we may suggest a new approach to explain the words of the
Rambam. The Gemara later (10a) first attempts to use a different Kal
v'Chomer to teach that it is considered she'Lo Lishmah when a Kohen
slaughters the animal with the intention of doing Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah.
The Gemara suggests a Kal v'Chomer from the Halachah of slaughtering the
Korban in the improper time. The Gemara says that a Korban which is
slaughtered with intention that the Shechitah should be performed "Chutz
l'Zmano" is valid, yet if one slaughters it in order to do the Zerikah
"Chutz l'Zmano," then the Korban is Pasul. Since we know that when a person
does Shechitah with intention that the Shechitah is for a different Korban
it *is* considered she'Lo Lishmah, then certainly if he does Shechitah with
intention that the Zerikah is for a different Korban then it should
certainly be she'Lo Lishmah. RASHI (DH Hareini Shochet and DH Hareini
Shochto) explains that having intention, during the Shechitah, that the
Shechitah is being done "Chutz l'Zmano" is a meaningless intention, because
the Shechitah is actually being done in the proper time.
Perhaps Rav Ashi's Kal v'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim is based on the same
type of logic. That is, there are two types of Shinuy Ba'alim. One type is
when a Kohen slaughters the Korban of Shimon having in mind that the
Shechitah should be done for Reuven, who, we know, does not own the Korban.
The other type is when a Kohen slaughters the Korban of Shimon and he thinks
that Shimon is Reuven. Although the first type of Shinuy Ba'alim indeed
makes the Korban be considered she'Lo Lishmah, the second type of Shinuy
Ba'alim is a meaningless thought, since, at the time of Shechitah, the owner
is standing next to the Korban and the Kohen intends that the Korban belongs
to that person. The fact that the Kohen thinks that Shimon is a different
person cannot make the Korban be considered she'Lo Lishmah, as long as the
Kohen intends for the Korban to be brought for the person (who is the true
owner) who is standing before him. However, during the Zerikah, there is no
parallel meaningless thought of Shinuy Ba'alim, because the owner is not
standing in front of the Kohen at the time that the Kohen performs the
Zerikas ha'Dam upon the Mizbe'ach. Therefore, if the Kohen does Zerikah with
intention that the Korban is for the wrong person, then it indeed will be
considered she'Lo Lishmah. This might be the Gemara's intention later (10a),
and the Gemara's intention in our Sugya, when it says that Shinuy Kodesh
applies in more Avodos than Shinuy Ba'alim. The Gemara means that *this*
type of Shinuy Ba'alim (the second type) does not apply during the Shechitah
(since the owner is there), but it does apply during the Zerikah.
The Rambam, on the other hand, is justified in not citing this distinction
between Shinuy Kodesh and Shinuy Ba'alim, because this distinction is
self-evident; this kind of Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim during Shechitah is
What, then, does the Gemara later (10a) mean when it proves that a Shechitah
with intention to do Zerikah for another Korban invalidates the Korban based
on a Kal v'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim? We do not find that a Shechitah with
intention to do Zerikah with Shinuy Ba'alim is Pasul! How, then, can we
learn that such a Machshavah with Shinuy Kodesh invalidates the Korban from
a Kal v'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim?
The answer is that the Gemara is not assuming that such a Machshavah
invalidates the Korban in the case of Shinuy Ba'alim. Rather, it is saying
that we see from Shinuy Ba'alim that more Machshavos can invalidate the
Korban at the time of Zerikah than at the time of Shechitah, since the
second type of Shinuy Ba'alim does not apply during the Shechitah.
Consequently, a wrong thought during Zerikah is more Chamur than during
Shechitah. If we know that Shechitah with intention that the animal is being
slaughtered for a different type of Korban is Pasul, then certainly
slaughtering an animal with intention that the Zerikah should be done for a
different type of Korban should be considered a Machshavah of she'Lo
Support for this way of reading the Gemara can be found in the words of Rav
Ashi. When Rav Ashi makes his Kal v'Chomer, he is careful to omit the three
words "Shechato Al Menas," implying that he is not discussing a case where
the Kohen slaughters an animal with intention to do the Zerikah for a
different person, but rather he is discussing a case in which the Kohen does
the Zerikah for a different person, and it is from this case that he is
making his Kal v'Chomer. (M. Kornfeld)
2) THE SOURCE THAT "BECHOR," "MA'ASER BEHEMAH," AND "PESACH" MUST BE OFFERED
QUESTION: The Gemara proves that a Kohen must bring a Korban Shelamim with
specific intent for the correct owner and for the correct type of Korban.
The Gemara asks how we know that this applies to other Korbanos as well.
Perhaps this requirement applies only to Shelamim, the laws of which are
more stringent than other Korbanos, because Shelamim requires Semichah,
Nesachim, and Tenufas Chazeh v'Shok. RASHI explains that most other Korbanos
require Semichah as well, and the Gemara's question from the Chumra of
Semichah of Shelamim is only from the three types of Korbanos which do not
require Semichah -- Bechor, Ma'aser Behemah, and Pesach. Since these
Korbanos do not require Semichah, they should not require Kavanah Lishmah.
The Gemara answers that all other Korbanos are compared by the verse to
Shelamim, as the verse says, "Zos ha'Torah..." (Vayikra 7:37).
3) A KORBAN THAT IS NOT "METATZEH" BUT THAT IS NEVERTHELESS VALID
How, though, does that verse teach us that Kavanah Lishmah is required for
Bechor, Ma'aser Behemah, and Pesach? Those three Korbanos are not mentioned
in the verse! If the Gemara means that those three Korbanos are included in
the category of Shelamim (since they are Kodshim Kalim), then why should it
be necessary to invoke the Hekesh to show that these Korbanos need to be
brought Lishmah? We already know that Shelamim needs to be brought Lishmah
from the verses cited earlier in the Gemara!
ANSWER: The Gemara apparently is relying on the teaching of the Beraisa
later (7b), which teaches that the words "b'Yom Tzavoso... l'Hakriv Es
Korbeneihem" (Vayikra 7:38) in the verse which follows the verse of the
Hekesh refer to Bechor, Ma'aser, and Pesach, and thus the Hekesh includes
those Korbanos as well.
QUESTION: After the Gemara derives the source that teaches that a Korban
that is slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah does not attain atonement (Meratzeh) for
its owner, the Gemara asks how we know that the Korban itself remains valid
even though it is not Meratzeh. Perhaps, asks the Gemara, a Korban that is
slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah is entirely Pasul! The Gemara answers that we
derive from the verse, "Motza Sefasecha" (Devarim 24:23) that the Korban is
valid even though it is not Meratzeh.
RASHI (DH Lifselu) writes that the Gemara's question is that a Korban
brought she'Lo Lishmah should be entirely Pasul, because it was not brought
according to the proper procedure, and the Zerikah of the Dam of the Korban
will not permit its meat to be eaten.
Rashi's words are difficult to understand. Why does Rashi explain that the
focus of the Gemara's question is that the meat of the Korban should be
prohibited to eat when it is brought she'Lo Lishmah? The Gemara seems to be
asking a much stronger question. A Korban that is brought she'Lo Lishmah
should be entirely Pasul and it should be prohibited to continue offering
it! (That is, if the Shechitah was done she'Lo Lishmah, then the Korban
should be Pasul and we should no longer be permitted to perform the Zerikah
and the other Avodos at all, and we should certainly not offer the Korban
upon the Mizbe'ach!) Why, then, does Rashi limit the Gemara's question to
asking that the meat of the Korban should be forbidden to be eaten?
ANSWER: The NETZIV in MEROMEI SADEH (2a) and the TAHARAS HA'KODESH here
explain that Rashi is answering the question of TOSFOS (DH Eima). Why does
the Gemara suggest that we should derive from the verse not only that a
Korban she'Lo Lishmah is not Meratzeh but that the Korban itself is Pasul?
There is a well-known rule that in laws of Kodshim, the failure to adhere to
a certain requirement that is taught by only a single verse does *not*
invalidate the Korban. With regard to the laws of Korbanos, a requirement
that appears once in the Torah is assumed to be *l'Chatchilah* and failure
to fulfill that requirement does not invalidate the Korban. Only when the
Torah *repeats* the law is that law "Me'akev" and it invalidates the Korban
even b'Di'eved if that law is not fulfilled.
These Acharonim propose that Rashi is answering this question by suggesting
that the Gemara does not really mean that we should derive from the verse
that the Korban is Pasul if it is not brought Lishmah, since the Gemara
knows that failure to fulfill a law taught by a single verse cannot
disqualify a Korban. Rather, the Gemara is suggesting that a single verse
should suffice to disqualify the Korban from being eaten, even if the Korban
itself is Kasher and can be offered upon the Mizbe'ach. (The Taharas
ha'Kodesh points out that we find a similar concept with regard to a Korban
that is brought b'Tum'ah, where the Korban can be offered on the Mizbe'ach
but cannot be eaten.) That is the Gemara's question.
The Gemara answers that the verse of "Motza Sefasecha" teaches that the
Korban may even be eaten.
How does this answer the question of Tosfos? We normally find that when a
requirement is mentioned in a single verse, not only is the Korban valid,
but it may even be eaten. Why, then, should a single verse make a Korban
that is slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah be forbidden to be eaten? The Taharas
ha'Kodesh answers that the verse of "Motza Sefasecha" teaches not only that
a Korban slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah may be eaten, but even that any Korban
that is missing any requirement of the Torah may be eaten, unless the Torah
mentions the requirement twice. (This is similar to the answer at the end of
Tosfos DH Eima, in which Tosfos asserts that "Motza Sefasecha" is the source
that teaches that two verses are required to make a Korban invalid."
(b) Perhaps Rashi is answering the question of Tosfos in another manner. The
SHITAH MEKUBETZES (#10) answers that it is true that a single verse normally
does not make the failure to fulfill a requirement able to invalidate a
Korban. For example, although the Torah says that a person must mix the
Minchah with oil, if he does not mix it, the Minchah is still accepted. In
the case of our Gemara, however, the Torah is not teaching a new
requirement. Rather, the Torah is teaching the way in which one must perform
the Avodos that have already been taught (Shechitah, Kabalah, Holachah, and
Zerikah). The Torah is teaching how to perform those Avodos. Therefore, if a
person does Shechitah (or any of the other Avodos) she'Lo Lishmah, we might
have thought that the Korban indeed is Pasul. We would have reasoned that
since a Korban that lacks Shechitah, or any of the four Avodos, is obviously
Pasul, so too, a Korban in which the Shechitah or other Avodos is done
she'Lo Lishmah is Pasul, because it is as if the Avodah was not done at all.
This is what Rashi means as well. Rashi writes that a Korban offered she'Lo
Lishmah should be Pasul because it was not offered "k'Hilchaso," meaning
that an Avodah that was done she'Lo Lishmah should be considered as though
the Avodah was not done. This is what Rashi means when he concludes by
saying that the Zerikah will not permit the meat to be eaten. He does not
mean to limit the Pesul to the meat, implying that the Korban is valid with
regard to the other Avodos. Rather, he means that the Pesul is in the
Zerikah itself makes it as if there was no Zerikah at all, and therefore the
meat will not be permitted (and it will similarly not be permitted for the
Eimurin to be brought upon the Mizbe'ach). Rashi mentions Zerikah, assuming
that the Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah was in the Zerikah, because the
Zerikah is the final Avodah, the Avodah which accomplishes the permitting of
the meat to be eaten and the Korban to be brought upon the Mizbe'ach (see
Bava Kama 76a). However, the same applies when any one of the previous
Avodos is lacking; the Zerikah will not be able complete the process of
offering the Korban and will not permit the meat to be eaten. Therefore, by
the same logic, it will not be permitted to complete any of the Avodos after
the Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah, since the Korban is Pasul.
Why does Rashi mention only that the Zerikah permits the meat to be eaten,
and not that it permits the Korban to be brought on the Mizbe'ach? The
answer is that perhaps it is because the Mishnah later (83a) teaches that
any Korban which became Pasul in the process of being offered and then was
placed on the Mizbe'ach is left on the Mizbe'ach, b'Di'eved. This shows that
the valid Zerikah is not necessarily the only thing that allows the Korban
to be placed on the Mizbe'ach. However, a valid Zerikah *is* the only
process that can permit a Korban to be eaten. Therefore, when Rashi
describes a Zerikah that is invalid, Rashi describes it as a Zerikah which
cannot permit the meat to be eaten. (M. Kornfeld)