CHAMISHOH MI YODEI'A - FIVE QUESTIONS ON THE WEEKLY SEDRAH - PARSHAS KI SOVO 5766 - BS"D
1) Ch. 26, v. 5: "V'oniso" - What is the translation of this word?
2) Ch. 26, v. 5: "Arami oveid ovi" - Who is Arami?
3) Ch. 26, v. 9: "Va'y'vi'einu el hamokom ha'zeh" - And He has brought us to
this place and he has given us this land. Rashi explains "this place" to mean
the location of the Beis Hamikdosh. It would then seem that the two
occurrences mentioned here are out of order, as the bnei Yisroel first were given Eretz
Yisroel, and only afterwards were at the location of the of the Beis Hamikdosh.
4) Ch. 26, v. 17-18: "He'emarta, He'emircha" - What is the translation of
5) Ch. 28, v.10: "Sheim Hashem nikra" - The gemara M'nochos 35b and the
medrash Shir Hashirim 7:6 (See also Targum Yonoson ben Uziel) say that this refers
to the tefillin "she'b'rosh," literally IN one's head. We have an halacha
l'Moshe miSinai that the exterior of the tefillin housing of the shel rosh has the
letter shin on it. a) Why a "shin"? b) Why does one of the two "shinin" have
four strokes and four heads rather than the normal three headed "shin"?
Answers to questions on parshas Ki Seitzei:
1) Ch. 21, v. 18: "V'lo yishma a'leihem" - Why do we judge the ben soreir
u'moreh "al sheim sofo," - for that to which his acts will eventually lead, i.e.
murder (mishnoh Sanhedrin 71b), even though he has not yet murdered anyone,
and yet by Yishmo'eil we find that Hashem saved his life by miraculously
producing a wellspring in the desert (Breishis 21:19) even though his progeny would
eventually cause some of the bnei Yisroel to die from thirst, because of the
dictum that we judge a person by the situation at hand and not by considerations
of what the future holds, "ba'asher hu shom" (Breishis 21:17), as per the
gemara R.H. 16b?
The Baalei Tosfos ask this and they give two answers:
1) "Hu atzmo" - The rebellious son has sinned HIMSELF, while it is only the
descendants of Yishmo'eil who have sinned regarding water.
2) "Mas'chil b'a'veiroh" - The rebellious son has already BEGUN sinning by
stealing, thus he has started down the road to eventually committing murder.
There is an allusion to the question raised and to the answers given within
our verse. (See Niflo'ose MiToro'secho page 174 who says part of the
following.) If we take the words "V'LO YISHMA" and the two following letters from the
beginning of the next word "A'Leihem," we have "V'LO YISHMO'EIL." This indicates
that the outcome of this situation is not the same as by Yishmo'eil. The
reason that it is different by the ben soreir u'moreh is shown in the remaining
letters of "a'leiHeM, Hei-Mem. The letter Yud does not serve a phonetic purpose,
as it accompanies the "tzei're" under the letter Lamed, and we are left with
Hei-Mem. Hei stands for "Hu atzmo," and Mem stands for "Mas'chil b'a'veiroh."
2) Ch. 21, v. 23: "Ki kil'las Elokim toluy" - Because a curse/cheapening of
G-d is hanging - Exactly what is the negative result of leaving the body of the
guilty person hanging?
1) Man is created in the image of Hashem (Breishis 9:6). Leaving a corpse,
made in the image of Hashem hanging is a cheapening of Hashem. (Rashi)
2) The dead corpse gives off a negative influence of a curse. (Ibn Ezra)
3) The gemara Sanhedrin 45b concludes that only he who sinned with idol
worship or blasphemed is hung after being put to death. Having his body hang for
an extended period of time brings spectators to ask why he was hung. They would
hear the details of how this person did one of the two sins just mentioned.
This discussion in its own right is either a cheapening of Hashem or will bring
a curse. (Ramban)
4) A dead body that is hanging is a most cursed and despicable situation. It
also brings impurity to the land. We are told that the Holy Land is a source
for blessing and not for curse "Ki shom tzivoh Hashem es habrochoh chaim"
(T'hilim 133:3). (Ramban)
5) It is a cheapening of Hashem to "advertise" the body of one who has so
grievously sinned against Hashem. (Ralbag)
6) It will bring about cursing the judges, called "elohim" (Shmos 22:27).
That verse prohibits cursing them. People who see the sorrowful sight will curse
the witnesses and the judges who brought this guilty person to justice.
3) Ch. 22, v. 19: "V'onshu oso mei'oh kesef v'nosnu la'avi hanaaroh" - The
words "v'nosnu la'avi hanaaroh" seem to clearly indicate that the father is the
recipient of the 100 kesef fine. Since the husband maligned his wife,
shouldn't she deserve the payment?
The Baalei Tosfos in Moshav Z'keinim mention in the name of Rabbi Hai Gaon:
1) That the father does not keep the money for himself, as his daughter is
already fully married, "n'suoh," but rather is only a safe-keeper of the
money, which actually belongs to his maligned daughter. This is also the opinion of
2) That the father does actually keep the money as a reward for coming to
court and taking up his daughter's case.
3) That the father actually does keep the money since he was also maligned,
albeit indirectly. (It seems that he suffers more shame than his daughter.)
4) Ch. 22, v. 22: "U'meisu gam shneihem" - The gemara Eruvin 7a derives from
the extra word "gam" that if a women is to be given the death penalty while
she is pregnant, and with waiting until after the birth we can allow for her
baby to be born, and then afterwards give her the death penalty, we don't wait,
but instead carry out the execution immediately. Why don't we derive this
ruling from the story of Tomor, Breishis 38:24?
1) Rabbi Yaakov Hamberger, the head of the Rabbinical court of Prague
answers by following the continuation of the above gemara. The gemara asks
that there is no need for a verse to tell us this as it is obvious, as the yet
unborn child is part of the pregnant woman's body. The gemara answers that
indeed a verse is needed, as I might take into consideration that the unborn
child is at the same time a financial asset of the husband, and he shouldn't lose.
Therefore a verse is needed to tell us that this is not taken into
consideration. With this he answers his question. Since in the story of Tomor, the judge
did not know who sired the child, monetarily, the child has a status of money
that has no claimant so there is no financial loss to anyone, and it is
obvious, as the gemara says, that there is no reason to wait for the birth. We
don't know from the story of Tomor that when we have a claimant, that we don't
wait, and for this we need a proof.
2) We cannot derive this ruling from before matan Torah. (Nirreh li)
3) Tomor's fetus is not a proof according to the judge's thinking that she
committed adultery, since the creation of the fetus was through a sin, it is
not taken into consideration. The gemara is bringing a proof for when the sin
carrying the death penalty was not one that brought about the creation of the
fetus. (Nirreh li)
4) Tomor's case is not a proof as she was a bas Kohein, daughter of
Malki-Tzedek, and was to be judged in a strict manner, death by "s'reifoh," as is the
case of adultery of a bas Kohein after matan Torah. This level of stringency
might even include not waiting for the birth. (Nirreh li)
5) Ch. 22, v. 23: "Umtzo'oh ish bo'ir" - And a man happened upon her in the
city - The Torah differentiates between this case of a man having relations
with a betrothed woman in the city, where they are both guilty of adultery, and
when this takes place in the field, away from the public domain, where only he
is guilty (verses 25-27). The Torah explains that in the situation that took
place in the city it is obvious that the woman was not forced, as she did not
scream (verse 24).
This is most puzzling, as the Torah differentiates between the cases and says
that in the former both are put to death, while in the latter only the man is
put to death, because we assume that the girl was forced. Since the death
penalty is only administered when the sinner is warned and responds that he/she
is aware of the consequences and is willingly going ahead with the act, how can
there be a difference by virtue of location? In both cases the girl must have
been warned or she would not be put to death regardless of location.
Rabbeinu Chaim Paltiel, Moshav Z'keinim, Sforno, and Chizkuni (Meshech
Chochmoh offers the same answer) all say that in both cases the witnesses happen
upon them when they are already involved in the sinful act. The girl was also
warned and said that she is willingly going ahead with it. Based on the gemara
K'subos 51b we have a ruling that if a woman was forced into committing adultery
even if she said in the middle of the act that she is a willing partner, she
is not held responsible since once involved it is possible that she developed
such a great lust that she cannot control her urge at this point. This is
called "t'chiloso b'o'ness v'sofo b'rotzon," starting off against one's will and
later consenting, which is ruled as being against one's will throughout. (See
Rambam hilchos ishus 24:19, hilchos Sanhedrin 20:3).
We now understand why the location plays a difference. When this takes place
in the public domain we circumstantially assume that the girl went along with
it from the beginning, as she would have otherwise cried out for help, knowing
that someone would hear. When this act takes place away from the public
domain, even if when she is warned and says that she is a willing partner in crime,
we do not punish her because we judge her favourably and say that she was
forced at the beginning of the encounter and only now consents because her
uncontrollable impulses have taken over.
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