Please summarize the main points of last shiur?

In the previous shiur we learned the rules that apply when one violates an issur d’oraisso unintentionally.

The main points to remember are that the Shulchan Aruch HaRav paskens according to R’ Yehuda who holds that nobody may benefit from the melacha until after Shabbos. The Vilna Ga’on paskens according to Tosefos who hold that everyone may benefit from the melacha on Shabbos.

The Mishna Berura arbitrates saying that when necessary one may be lenient and follow the Vilna Ga’on. We suggested though, that one must ask a rav as to define what necessary is.

Do the same rules apply when violating an issur d’rabanan?

The Bi’ur Halacha [1] cites the P’ri Megadim who learns that d’rabanan shares a similar fate as a d’oraisso and argues on his p’sak.

He continues with the Vilna Ga’on who learns that regarding a d’rabanan, even R’ Yehuda rules that the perpetrator may benefit from his handiwork on Shabbos and he supports this with the Chayei Adam.

Final word is that if one unintentionally violates an issur d’rabanan, one may benefit from the issur on Shabbos.

Can you provide some examples?

As usual, the examples are intended to give an idea how a rov would pasken but are not intended to be a p’sak. In all instances one must seek halachic guidance.

v     Food was carried through a carmelis [2] and brought to shul. The people who carried the food thought that the eiruv was intact and upon arrival learned that it was broken. An issur d’rabanan has been violated, albeit unintentionally, with the result that the food may be eaten.

v     This one’s tricky: pouring boiling water from a water urn directly onto tealeaves in a teabag is an issur d’oraisso of bishul. Placing a teabag into a k’li sheini [3] might involve a d’oraisso being that tealeaves are kalei habishul (items that cook easily) and as such one cannot be lenient. You can argue and say that a cup of tea is necessary and rely on the Vilna Ga’on, but one can easily make another cup of tea avoiding Shabbos violations and forfeit this tea.

But what if there is no tea essence or it’s the last teabag? It depends on how dependant one is on that cup of tea and if without it one will suffer.

v     Bread or cookies were ground on a grinding board, [4] unbeknown that it is an uvda d’chol [5] to use a grinding board. Although one is permitted to grind bread and cookies, as one may grind an item that has been previously ground. Since it is an issur d’rabanan one may use and consume the ground bread and cookies.

When a non-religious person performs a melacha for himself or for a religious person, is the melacha deemed meizid or shogeig?

The problem is as follows: a shogeig is defined as one of the two, either one knows it is Shabbos but did not know or forgot that the melacha is prohibited, or one forgot that it is Shabbos.

A non-frum Jew might know that a certain melacha is prohibited but has decided that religion is not for him and thus his action does not conform to either of the above.

Seemingly then his action is a meizid (intentional violation), which according to all, prohibits benefiting from the item until after Shabbos.

Is this true of all non-frum Jews?

I think not. Many non-frum Jews are of the opinion that since they have chosen not to live a frum life, the torah restrictions do not apply to them and they are permitted to “violate” the torah rules. We find a major opinion in halacha [6] that says àåîø îåúø àðåñ äåà – one who says it is permitted is not faulty, i.e. he is not labeled as doing something with intention to violate the issur.

Based on that it is possible to say that a non-frum Jew who mistakenly thinks that he is not obligated to adhere to torah laws, is considered doing melachos b’shogeig.

Consequently, when such a person violates the Shabbos one may benefit from the melacha on Shabbos when necessary. Obviously this is a very delicate issue and one cannot pasken without speaking to a rov competent in these laws.

It is very hard to decide who is a îçìì ùáú áôøäñéà (a wanton Shabbos violator and a meizid) and therefore some poskim do not differentiate and consider non-frum people to be close to meizid. Consequently, each case is individual and a Rov must be asked. [7]

Must one wait the time of bichdei she’ya’asu (the time it takes to perform the melacha) after Shabbos before benefiting from the melacha?

The Shulchan Aruch writes [8] that food cooked on Shabbos b’shogeig is prohibited to all on Shabbos but permitted immediately after Shabbos and one need not wait the time of bichdei she’ya’asu.

Why when a gentile performs a melacha for a Jew one must wait bichdei she’ya’asu?

The reason is twofold. If one was permitted to benefit from a melacha right after Shabbos, one might still instruct a gentile to perform a melacha on Shabbos to benefit from it right after Shabbos, therefore Chazal prohibited use of the item the time it takes to perform the melacha to negate any benefit from it.

This reason does not apply to a Jew because a) a Jew will not agree to violate the Shabbos for a fellow Jew, and b) one will not instruct a Jew to violate the Shabbos. [9]