This is the mitzva of Shemittas Kesafim - the prohibition concerning the collection of debts that become due before the end(3) of the Shemitta year. Although working the land, the primary restriction of Shemitta only applies in Eretz Yisrael(4), the prohibition against collecting one's debts applies in all countries. When the majority of Jews lived in Eretz Yisrael and the laws of Yovel (Jubilee year) were in effect, the prohibition of collecting debts was applicable according to biblical law(5). Nowadays, since the majority of Jews live outside of Eretz Yisrael(6), and the laws of Yovel do not apply, the biblical prohibition of collecting debts is also suspended. However, the Rabbis decreed that the laws of Shemittas Kesafim should continue to apply in all countries(7).

REASONS FOR SHEMITTAS KESAFIM.

As strange as the mitzva of relinquishing one's loans may seem, there are important lessons in regard to this commandment. The Sefer HaChinuch(8) explains that the first useful benefit to be gained is the characteristic of generosity. There is none so generous as he who gives without hope of receiving anything in return. So too, relinquishing a loan with no benefit or gain in mind imbues a person with this noble character trait.

The second lesson mentioned in the Chinuch relates to the mitzva of bitachon - trust in Hashem. Anyone who, upon command, relinquishes all outstanding debts, is continuously strengthening his level of trust in Hashem. The creditor displays trust that any losses incurred will be fully reimbursed to his allocated and pre-determined wealth. The knowledge of G-d as the source of all livelihood and provider of all one's needs is confirmed, and substantiated when releasing a debtor from his debts.

The Chinuch continues that the mitzva of Shemittas kesafim is also a 'barrier' to keep away from robbery and any desire to own the possessions of one's neighbour, via a kal v'chomer. If the Torah decrees that one should leave a loan in his neighbour's hand concerning money that is rightfully owed to him, then certainly he may not obtain his neighbour's belongings, in any way, without his neighbour's consent(9).

ORIGIN OF PRUZBUL

The Mishna(10) states "A pruzbul (i.e. loan on which the borrower has written a pruzbul document) does not relinquish (the loan and may be collected after Shemitta). This is one of the things that Hillel the Elder instituted. He saw that people refrained from lending money to one another as Shemitta approached, for fear that they would not be repaid on time. They thereby transgressed that which is written in the Torah(11) 'take heed lest there be an evil thought in your heart, etc.' (saying 'The seventh year the year of relinquishment draws near and your eye will be mean towards your poor brother and you will not give him the loan that he seeks). Hillel therefore instituted pruzbul. And this is the essence of a pruzbul: "I submit before you, XYZ the judges, in such and such a place, that every debt owed to me by "Mr. A" may be collected whenever I wish. The judges or witnesses sign below."

As stated in the above Mishna, the reason for the institution of pruzbul was the reluctancy to offer loans for fear of the Shemitta cancellation, thereby transgressing a commandment in the Torah. Hillel therefore recommended that people execute a contract for formally transferring their loans to Beis Din. The contract that Hillel devised to expedite this process is known as pruzbul.

Pruzbul is a hybrid word composed of 'pruz' - protective enactment, and 'bul' - wealthy(12). Rav Chisda(13) explains that the original form was really pruz-bulei-butei, that is a protective document for the wealthy and the poor. The rich benefited in that they were able to safeguard their loans, and the poor benefited in that it enabled them to obtain loans. Nevertheless, the suffix 'butei' is not commonly used because the main thrust of the enactment was to protect the creditors(14).

The Gemara(15) questions Hillel's enactment based on the general rule that the Rabbis have no power to actively abrogate a Toah law. Here the Toah commands the creditor not to collect his loan following the Shemitta year. How could Hillel decree that he may? The Gemara(16) answers that Hillel instituted pruzbul to be effective only with regard to Shemitta nowadays (following the view articulated by Rebbi), which is of rabbinic origin. Thus Hillel's institution of pruzbul abrogated not the biblical law of debt cancellation, but the rabbinic counterpart of that law which was certainly in his power to do.

HOW A PRUZBUL WORKS

It is apparent from the text of the pruzbul referred to in the Mishna mentioned earlier, that the creditor effectively submits his debts to the Beis Din for collection, thereby avoiding the Shemitta prohibition. The previous Mishna(17) concludes, "and one who hands his documents to the court does not have his loan cancelled." This exemption is based on the verse "But from that which you have by your brother, you should relinquish your hand."(18)

Sifri(19) and Yerushalmi(20) explain the verse as an indication that a debt that is no longer in one's hand, i.e. it has been handed over to Beis Din for collection, is not subject to cancellation. Most Rishonim are of the opinion that this is a scriptural exemption, providing the promissory notes are actually handed over to the Beis Din. Merely handing over the debts verbally is only a rabbinic institution, as will be discussed.

Other Rishonim(21) believe that this is not a scriptural exemption, even when the documents are handed over to the Beis Din. Rather, the basis for the ruling of the Mishna that exempts one who hands in his document to the court, is derived from the power of Beis Din to declare the property of a person ownerless - via the well-known maxim principle 'hefker Beis Din hefker'' - "whatever is declared ownerless by the Beis Din is ownerless. " The allusion to this rule noted earlier from the Yerushalmi and Sifri is merely an asmachta - a hint - and is insufficient to serve on the basis for the law. A third opinion is found in Tosafos,(22) who holds that the drasha is a scriptural exemption and includes even when the documents are not handed over to the Beis Din.

The working of a pruzbul is dependent on the above dispute. When utilising a pruzbul, no loan documents are handed over to the Beis Din. Therefore, according to the first opinion, Hillel's institution of pruzbul cannot be based on the ruling of the Mishna or on the scriptural exemption of the handing over one's debt to the Beis Din. Evidently, the pruzbul is a new enactment based on hefker Beis Din hefker - that whatever the Beis Din declares ownerless, is ownerless. The second opinion goes a step further, and learns that the Mishna's rule that one who may hand over his documents to the court is also derived from the drasha quoted in the Yerushalmi and Sifri, based on hefker Beis Din hefker, which is all part and parcel of Hillel's pruzbul institution. However the third opinion goes to the other extreme, and learns that the pruzbul fully qualifies as a scriptual exemption of handing over one's debts to the Beis Din mentioned in the Mishna. According to this opinion, Hillel instituted merely the custom to use this option of handing over the debts on a regular basis. The mechanics of the pruzbul are of biblical origin, as explained.

TIME TO WRITE A PRUZBUL

The Torah states(23) "At the end of the seven years you shall make a relinquishment etc." The simple meaning of this verse implies that the cancellation of debts due to the Shemitta year takes place at the end of the seventh year, that is the last moment of the last day of the seventh year(24). Since a pruzbul may be written any time before the nullification takes place, therefore a pruzbul may be written any time before the end of the Shemitta year. However, the pruzbul is only valid for loans that predate it, but not for loans extended after the execution of the pruzbul(25).

For example, if someone writes a pruzbul three months prior to the end of the Shemitta year (Rosh Chodesh Tammuz) he may only collect payment of loans extended before those three months, but he may not collect any loan extended during those three months(26), unless another pruzbul was written. It is therefore customary to write the pruzbul during the last few days before Rosh Hashana, so as to include all loans(27).

However, some communities have the custom of writing a pruzbul prior to the Shemitta year, in addition(28) to the pruzbul written before the end of the Shemitta year, as previously mentioned. This custom is based on the opinion of the Rosh(29) who holds that the laws of Shemittas Kesafim, that is the prohibition of collecting debts, apply from the beginning of the Shemitta year. Although Shulchan Aruch(30) clearly rejects this opinion, as do virtually all poskim(31), there are still some poskim(32) who recommend writing a pruzbul twice, hence the origin to the custom of writing a pruzbul before the Shemitta year begins and again before it ends(33).

TYPE OF DEBTS AFFECTED BY SHEMITTA

The laws of Shemittas Kesafim apply not only to monetary loans, but include any borrowing of consumables e.g.: household items such as flour and eggs, where the item itself will not be returned, but will be replaced by another similar one(34).

However, credit offered for purchases or services rendered (e.g. at a supermarket or bakery) where the owner charges his customers' accounts, is not affected by the passing of the Shemitta year(35).

Some Rishonim(36) associate the above exemption with loans that are not due until the passing of Shemitta. Shemitta does not affect a loan that becomes due only after Shemitta. This is based on the verse(37) 'he shall not demand it of his friend,' which implies that the creditor could otherwise have demanded payment(38). Similarly, payments for accounts are not due until billed. Only once a considerable amount has accumulated, or on a monthly basis, does the creditor total the amount owing, and then the obligation is formally established as a debt(39).

CHEQUE PAYMENTS

As noted, the prohibition to collect debts does not apply until the last moment of the Shemitta year has passed and Rosh Hashana of the following year begun. Any loan that was repaid before Rosh Hashana is evidently not cancelled by Shemitta. However, if payment was made by cheque (and funds have not yet cleared to the account of the creditor before Rosh Hashana), it is possible that the loan may not be considered paid, even when there are sufficient funds in the debtor's account. Consequently, the loan will be cancelled at the last moment of the Shemitta year. This may vary from country to country(40).

PRE-REQUISITE FOR WRITING A PRUZBUL

MAKE UP OF BEIS DIN

The Rishonim are in disagreement to the make up of the Beis Din necessary for the execution of a pruzbul. Some Rishonim(41) are of the opinion that the Beis Din must consist of people who are familiar with the laws of Shemitta and pruzbul, and who serve as an official Beis Din of the community. Others(42) maintain that a simple Beis Din of three people is sufficient.

The Shulchan Aruch(43) accepts the first opinion, while the Rema(44) states that nowadays one may rely on the second opinion. Consequently Ashkenazic custom is to follow the lenient opinion. Some Achronim(45) however, stipulate that the three individuals be bnei Torah - people who study Torah regularly.

PRESENCE OF BEIS DIN

The Yerushalmi(46) states that a pruzbul is valid "even if they are in Rome." There is a dispute among the Rishonim to the exact meaning of this statement. Some(47) understand it to mean that even if the 'Beis Din' is in Rome, creditors in Eretz Yisrael may transfer their debts to the Beis Din, that is in the presence of two witnesses. Other Rishonim(48) understand the words of the Yerushalmi differently. "Even if they are in Rome" is referring rather to the promissory notes that the creditors in Eretz Yisroel may give those loans to Beis Din using a pruzbul. Accordingly, we have no basis to allow the use of a pruzbul without the presence of a Beis Din.

Shulchan Aruch(49) brings both opinions, apparently favouring the former opinion, permitting the use of a pruzbul between two witnesses, not in the presence of Beis Din. This is also the ruling of some Achronim(50).

Another option would be to write a letter to the Beis Din, transferring all debts to the Beis Din(51). The Beis Din would then write a pruzbul. Some poskim(52) mention yet another option: to appoint an agent to execute the pruzbul on one's behalf.

OWNERSHIP OF REAL ESTATE

A pruzbul is not effective unless the borrower(53) possesses land. The Rishonim dispute the reason for this. Rashi's(54) opinion is as follows: as a general rule, the Rabbis legislated their enactments only for usual and regular circumstances. Since it is unusual for people to lend money if the loan is not secured by real property, the rabbinical enactment of pruzbul does not apply. The Rashbam(55), however, explains that the reason for this limitation is based on the ruling of another Mishna(56). The Torah formulates the law that loans are cancelled during the Shemitta year by commanding the lender not to press the borrower for repayment, as the passuk states "this is the matter of the Shemitta...he shall not press his fellow or his brother for he has proclaimed a Shemitta for Hashem."(57) Therefore, if a lender took an object as a collateral, in which case he does not press the borrower for repayment, the loan is not cancelled, even according to biblical law. When the Sages instituted the law of pruzbul, they did not wish to even appear to be annulling a law of the Torah. Insofar as land is always available for repayment of the loan, it bears some resemblance to a collateral, and thus serves to soften the impression that the Rabbis are annulling a law of the Torah. Therefore, they ruled that a pruzbul is ineffective unless the borrower owns land from which the loan may be collected.

As to precisely when the borrower must possess land - at the time of writing the pruzbul or end of Shemitta year - depends on the dispute mentioned(58). According to Rashi's reasoning, having land at the time of the loan is the requirement for a 'regular loan.' However, according to the Rashbam, it would depend on the time of cancellation of the loan - the end of the Shemitta year.

Owning land merely upon the receipt of the loan does not qualify to enable the writing at a pruzbul according to any opinion(59).

Although Shemittas Kesafim is time-bound, women are obligated in this mitzva(60). With regard to the writing of a pruzbul, a married woman is included in her husband's pruzbul. If she lent her own money, where her husband has no legal right of ownership, she must write her own pruzbul(61).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we will mention one other aspect for the mitzva of Shemitta, which teaches us a most significant lesson that pertains to our everyday lives.

To understand any concept in the Torah at its most fundamental level, one must look at the first place that particular subject is mentioned in the Torah. The first reference to Bnei Yisrael's affluence is when they depart from Egypt. They were commanded to ask their Egyptian neighbours for utensils of silver and gold, in fulfillment of Hashem's promise to Avraham Avinu many years earlier - that his descendents would leave Mitzrayim with great wealth.

However the Torah uses an interesting terminology in regard to this mitzva - 'vayishalu - and they should borrow' these vessels from their Egyptian neighbours. Essentially, the Jewish people had no intention of returning these vessels to the Egyptians. Therefore the correct terminology should have been 'and they should take.'

The Chidushei HaRim(62) explains that the term borrow used here is not being used with regard to the Egyptians. As far as they were concerned, the gold and silver was being taken permanently, as payment for all the years of bondage(63). Borrow is being used with regard to Hashem. At this very first time when klal Yisrael were obtaining an abundance of wealth and riches, the Torah is stressing that the money does not belong to them. It is borrowed from Hashem.

This is the message of the mitzva of Shemitta(64). The observance of Shemitta, during which we allow our land to lie fallow for an entire year, and relinquish all debts and money owing to ourselves, emphasizes that Hashem is the ultimate owner of the land and of all our wealth(65). In His infinite goodness, He grants each individual his fortune, and has commanded its yield and distribution in the way He sees fit.

Accordingly, we may add a deeper meaning to the term 'pruzbul,' and why the suffix 'butei' regarding the poor was omitted. Although when writing a pruzbul one is trying to avoid the cancellation of his loans due to the Shemitta year, Chazal are reminding him not to forget the message of Shemittas Kesafim. Remembering the mitzva of Shemitta is a pruz, a takana (an enactment) and in situation for the bulei (wealthy) a reminder that affluence is only a loan, and to constantly focus on our real goal in life.

FOOTNOTES

1.The issues discussed in this article are of a general nature, and are intended to give the reader an overall view. However, due to the many intricacies involved, a competent halachic authority should be consulted with regard to any practical application or execution of the pruzbul document.
2. Dev. 15:1-2
3. See below, Time of cancellation, for a discussion concerning this point.
4. There is a dispute among the poskim (authorities) if the biblical prohibition remains in effect, even today, or is it rabbinical. See Chazon Ish Sheviis no. 3.
5. See Tosafos Gittin 36a, s.v. B'zman , for a discussion of this issue. See also Biur Halacha (Derech Emuna from Harav Chaim Kanievsky Shlita), Hilchos Shemitta v'Yovel 9:2 s.v. Ein).
6. Chazon Ish Y.D. 64:2 explains that these days, even if the majority of Jews were to reside in Eretz Yisrael, the biblical prohibition still would not take effect. Only when the majority of Jews return to their tribal plots in Eretz Yisrael will the Yovel laws once again become biblical in nature (see Erichin 32b). As noticed in Rishonim, the tribal division of Eretz Yisrael was abolished at the time of the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash. Yovel can therefore not take effect before the coming of Mashiach.
7. See Sefer Yereim mitzvah 164 and Bach Chosen Mishpat 67:5, contrary to the view of Terumos Hadeshen 304, who is of the opinion that only countries close to Eretz Yisrael (as we find regarding the laws of terumos and ma'asros) were included in the decree. The Sages' authority to nullify a loan that is still owed from a biblical standpoint is discussed in Gittin 36b.
8. Mitzva 477
9. For another reason for this mitzva, see conclusion of article.
10. Sheviis 10:3,4.
11. Dev. 15:9
12. Rashi Gittin 36b Rav Sheviis 10:3. However, Rashbam Bava Basra 65b explains pruz from the root "expand" i.e. Hillel gave the wealthy leeway to protect their loans. See Tos. Yom Tov Sheviis ibid. In the Mishna the version commonly used is pruzbul, while in the Gemara, except when quoting a Mishana, prosbul. But it does not seem to be dependent on this difference.
13. Gittin 36b
14. Shenos Eliyahu, Sheviis 10:3. See conclusion of article for another explanation
15. Gittin 36b
16. According to Rashi ibid, Rava there gives another answer to this question; see Tosafos 36a s.v. Mi.
17. Sheviis 10:2. See Pruzbul document included at the back of this issue
18. Devarim 15:3
19. Parshas Re'eh (noted in Torah Temima ibid.)
20. Sheviis 10:1
21. Rashi Gittin 36a 37a s.v. Dtafsi (see Tos. 36a s.v. Mi) and Ramban Gittin 36a.
22. Gittin 36a s.v. Mi.
23. Dev. 15:1
24.The Gra in Shenos Eliyahu (Sheviis 10:8) remarks that we find the Torah too gives the name Shemitta to the beginning of the eighth year. In regard to the law of Hakhel, the Torah states (Dev. 37:10) "At the end of the seven years, on the occasion of the Shemitta a year, and it is clear from etc." the verse and the Mishna in Sota 7:8 the reference here is to the Succos festival immediately following the Shemitta year.
25. See footnote 33.
26.Concerning loans extended within thirty days before Rosh Hashana, see Dvar Avraham 1:32. Yechave Daas 4:62. If the principle of "stam halva'a shloshim yom" qualifies the loan as being due only after Shemitta, hence not being effected by the passing of Shemitta.
27. For those who have the custom of writing the pruzbul on erev Rosh Hashana, care should be taken to write the pruzbul prior to the onset of Rosh Hashana at the place where any debtor may be. For example, a Jew in America who loaned money to a resident of Australia, should execute his pruzbul prior to Rosh Hashana in Australia. See Minchas Shlomo 47:2.
28. It must be emphasized that those who follow this custom, must be careful to write a second pruzbul before the end of the Shemitta year, to enable collection of debts during the Shemitta year.
29. Gittin 4:20. The Rosh asserts that there are two facets to the law of relinquishment of debt. The first is nullification of debt, i.e. the debt legally ceases to exist. This facet of law takes effect at the end of the Shemitta year as stated explicitly in the verse quoted above. Thus, the debt is technically owed throughout the Shemitta year. The second factor that prevents the collection of debts during the Shemitta year is the separate prohibition upon the creditor, not to press the debtor for payment. This prohibition is based on the verse (Dev. 15:2) "he may not press his fellow man...for He has proclaimed a Shemitta." Since this verse does not state 'at the end of the Shemitta year' as previous verses to the contrary as soon as Shemitta is proclaimed, he may not press his fellow man, the Rosh therefore says this prohibition applies throughout the Shemitta year. Thus, according to the view of the Rosh, one may not press for payment from the beginning of the Shemitta year. Nevertheless, if the debtor voluntarily repays the debt the creditor may accept it without declaring 'I relinquish (the debt) as is required with regard to a loan which was nullified by the passing of the entire Shemitta year (see Sheviis ch.10). Accordingly, the Rosh (4:18) accepts a reading in the Tosefta (8:11) that requires the pruzbul to be made prior to the Shemitta year. Consequently, activating a pruzbul is prohibited during Shemitta. (Beis Yosef C.M. 67 points out that The Rosh had an erroneous version of the Tosefta).
30. C.M. 67:30.
31. Radvaz 5:2238; Panim Meiros 2:174; Yehuda Yaleh 3:179; Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 180:13; Yechaveh Daas 4:62; Rav Pe'alim in Yesod Yeshurin 1:11.
32.Shulchan Aruch Harav Hil Halva'a 36; Urim v'Tumim 67:26.
33. As explained, if one were to lend money after writing a pruzbul, the loan would be cancelled by Shemitta. To avoid this, one should set the due date for the time after the passing of Shemitta. Any loan that becomes due only after Shemitta is not cancelled by Shemitta. Rabbi S.Y. Elyashiv Shlita quoted in Tzion Halacha (Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky Shlita) Hil. Shemitta v'Yovel 9:97
34. Meleches Shlomo Sheviis 10:2, Chaim Shaal 2:38:13, Ben Ish Chai Ki Savo 1:26
35. Sheviis 10:1
36. Rambam in Peirush Hamishnayos Sheviis 10:1. See Kesef Mishna Hil. Shemitta v'Yovel 9:11 and Sma C.M. 67:26.
Other Rishonim (Tosafos and Ran Kesubos 55a, based on a Sifri Par. Re'eh) disagree and explain the reason for the above exemption differently, saying that the laws of Shemitta apply to a debt only, not to a purchase. When the customer pays his account, he is paying for a purchase rather than a debt. Only once the merchant has formally established the payment as debt before Shemitta passes, does the debt receive the status of a loan, and consequently is affected by the passing of Shemitta. The basic concept underlying the distinction between loans and monies owed for merchandise or wages is that in stating the laws of Shemitta cancellation, the Torah uses the term 'Bal Mashei' (creditor); a term that specifically connotes one who has made a loan. A shopkeeper who has not yet collected his payment for merchandise (or an artisan for services rendered) is not considered to have made a loan. It is only when the debt is converted into a loan for later payment , that the debt is viewed as being an outlay of money and a loan of sorts (Shenos Eliyahu Sheviis ibid).
A simple difference between these opinions would be in the case of selling merchandise, for example furniture or homewares, where payment is usually made at the time of the sale, and no date is set for payment. According to the latter view, Shemitta would not cancel the outstanding money, since it originates from a sale, not a loan. However, according to the former view, the debt would be cancelled since the money is due immediately, Derech Emuna Shemitta v'Yovel 9:57 quoting Beis Yosef and Achronim.
37. Dev. 15:2
38. See Makkos 3a-b concerning someone extending a ten-year loan, where the debt may be collected at the end of the ten years. With regard to the following Shemitta (after the ten years have passed) see Shemittas Kesafim Kehilchoso p24.
39. There is a disagreement among the Poskim, if the debtor must be notified via a bill or the like to be classified as a loan, or even merely totaling the sum owed can turn the debt into a loan. See C.M. 67:14. Another opinion considers it a loan when a payment date is assigned to the debt (Rosh Gittin 4:18, Rema ibid.).
40. This depends on intrinsic details concerning banking regulations with regard to cheques. In the U.S.A. a cheque contains merely instructions to the bank to release funds to the person nominated in the cheque. It does not represent a transfer of funds. Israeli law, based on British law (where it is a crime to stop payment on a cheque) may be viewed differently. This discussion is also relevant to hilchos ribbis (collecting interest), if cashing cheques at a discount would be a violation of ribbis. This issue is elaborated on in The Laws of Ribbis chapter 12, paragraph 32, and appendix 3.
With regard to Australia, we would first have to ascertain the legalities in cheque payment before any conclusion concerning Shemitta can be drawn, which is beyond the scope of this article. It has been suggested that receiving a cheque should be exempt from the Shemitta cancellation, since there is no need for the creditor to collect anything from the debtor, and would be classified similarly to one who lends upon collateral.
Evidently, when writing a pruzbul, the above discussion is not relevant and the loans are not affected in any way.
41. Rambam Hilchos Shmitta V'Yovel 9:17 (according to Rema, see Kesef Mishna ibid). Rabbeinu Tam quoted in Tosfos Gittin 36b s.v. Dalimei. See Beis Yosef & Bach C.M. 67 for an elaboration concerning the view of the Rambam and Rabbeinu Tam.
42. Rosh, Ritva Gittin 36b.
43. Choshen Mishpat 67:18.
44. Ibid. See Biur Hagra No. 31 who connects this dispute to the one cited in Shulchan Aruch 67:20.
45. Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 180:15. Shulchan Aruch Harav Hilchos Halvaa No. 35 requires only "Anashim Kisheirim." The custom of the Chazon Ish was to use the official Beis Din of the community.
46. Sheviis 10:3
47. Mordechai Gittin No. 379, see Pnei Moshe Yerushalmi ibid.
48. Rambam to Gittin 36b, Rashba Teshuvos 2:313.
49. C.M. 67:21.
50. Aruch Hashulchan 67:10; Teshuvos Chasam Sofer Teshuvos HaRashba C.M. No. 50; Yechaveh Daas 4:63.
51. Pischei Teshuva C.M. 67: 3 quoting Teshuvos Chasam Sofer C.M.113.
52. Birkei Yosef 434:5, Yechaveh Daas 4:64.
53. The Ba'al HaTerumos Sha'ar 45 writes that the lender must also own land but none of the poskim have quoted this l'halacha.
54. Gittin 37a. Also quoted in Rashbam Bava Basra 66a.
55. Bava Basra 66a.
56. One who lends on a collateral does not have his loan cancelled, Sheviis 10:2.
57. Devarim 15:2
58. See Ran Gittin 36-37
59. See Shemittas Kesafim Kehilchasa p103.
60. Chinuch Mitzva 477. For an elaboration concerning this issue, see Biur Halacha Hil. Shemitta v'Yovel 9:1 s.v. Mitzvas Asei.
61. Shemittas Kesafim K'hilchasa p110.
62. Parshas Bo 11:2
63. See Sanhedrin 91a
64. This is also the message of Yovel. During the Yovel year, in addition to real estate returning to its original owner, Jewish slaves go free. We lack sufficient ownership to be able to give away or sell our land forever, and do not own our slaves entirely.
65. Rabbi E. Shlezinger in his Sefer Beis Av (parsha Behar) adds the following point. Interestingly, the laws in relation to cheating a fellow Jew in a transaction (ona'a) are taught between the parshios of Shemitta and Yovel. As emphasized, both Shemitta and Yovel stress that Hashem is the true owner of everything we possess and control. For one who perceives these lessons in their entirety, dishonesty becomes unimaginable. Obviously, one who cheats has not understood the message of Shemitta and Yovel correctly.