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1)

(a) The Tana Kama of a Beraisa forbids soaking flax and washing clothes in wine of Shevi'is - which he learns from "le'Ochlah", 've'Lo le'Mishrah ... ve'Lo li'Kevusah'.

(b) Rebbi Yossi learns from "Lachem" - that soaking flax and washing clothes in wine of Shevi'is is permitted.

(c) The Tana Kama learns from "Lachem" - that any species that (unlike food) gives benefit after it has been destroyed, is permitted.

(d) When washing clothes, the benefit from the fuel comes only when the garments are clean. In order to benefit from the wine in which the flax is soaking - it will take three to four days.

(a) Despite the fact that the benefit of the soaking and the washing come only after the wine has been destroyed, the Tana Kama nevertheless forbids it - because we are talking about fruit which S'tam is meant for eating (and he is the Tana who holds the S'vara 'S'tam Eitzim le'Hasakah Hein Omdin', which means that go after the regular use of each individual species, both le'Kula amd le'Chumra.).

(b) Rebbi Yossi nevertheless permits it - because he does not hold 'S'tam Eitzim le'Hasakah Ninhu' (and it is forbidden to use wood as a torch, but permitted to use food for laundering).

(c) And the Torah writes le'Ochlah" - to forbid using food as a cure.

(d) He includes soaking and washing from "Lachem" and precludes healing (despite the fact that they both benefit the user only after they have been destroyed) - because the former is 'Shaveh ba'Kol' (is something which everyone needs), whereas the latter (which applies only to sick people), is not.

(a) The Beraisa learns "le'Ochlah", 've'Lo li'Melugma ... ve'Lo le'Ziluf ... ve'Lo La'asos Mimenah Apiktozan'. The meaning of ...

1. ... 'Ziluf' is - sprinkling wine around the house to create a pleasant aroma.
2. ... 'Apiktozan' is - something that one eats as a vomitive (after having eaten in excess).

(b) The author of this Beraisa is - Rebbi Yossi, who confines the Isur to things that are not Shaveh ba'Kol (whereas according to the Rabbanan, the Beraisa should have included 've'Lo li'Mishrah ... ve'Lo li'Kevusah'.

(a) Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah rules that in the case where the dyer changed the instructions and dyed the wool the wrong color, he must return the wool to the owner, who pays the least of the Sh'vach and the expenses.

Rav Yosef turned his back to Rav Huna - when he ruled like Rebbi Yehudah ... (b) ... because, he claimed, seeing as it is a Machlokes ve'Achar-Kach S'tam, where the Halachah is not like the S'tam.

(c) When this incident took place - Rav Yosef was sitting behind Rebbi Aba.

(a) At the same sitting, Rav Huna also ruled like Yehoshua ben Korchah. The Rabbanan in a Beraisa, forbid lending Nochrim money prior to their festivals or claiming one's debts from them - in case they then go and offer thanks to their gods.

(b) Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah - differentiates between claiming a documented loan (which he forbids) and an oral one (which he permits due to the fear that he might lose his money (because who knows whether the witnesses will be available later?).

(c) Rav Yosef acceptes this ruling of Rav Huna more the previous one - because (based on the principle 'Yachid ve'Rabim, Halachah ke'Rabim') had he not issued it, we would have ruled like the Rabbanan.

(a) As we just explained, Rav Yosef considered Rav Huna's ruling redundant because it is Machlokes ve'Achar-Kach S'tam. The S'tam Mishnah in Bava Metzi'a states 'Kol ha'Meshaneh, Yado al ha'Elyonah - ve'Chol ha'Chozer Bo, Yado al ha'Elyonah'.

(b) Rav Huna counters Rav Yosef's argument, by pointing out that otherwise, we would apply the principle 'Ein Seider le'Mishnah'.

(c) In fact, Rav Yosef would not have questioned Rav Huna, had the S'tama occurred in most other Masechtos. He queried it simply because it happened to occur in Bava Metzi'a - because he concedes that in two Masechtos, we say 'Ein Seider le'Mishnah', only he holds that Nezikin (by which he means the three Bavas, Kama, Metzi'a and Basra, are all considered one Masechta).

(d) Rav Huna holds that the three Bavas are three Masechtos.

8)

(a) In a case where a Sheli'ach puchases barley with the money that was he received to purchase wheat in an investment partnership, one Beraisa rules that he bears the full liability for any losses, and enjoys the full benefits from any gains. The second Beraisa says - that although he must bear the brunt of any losses, the owner shares the gains with him.

(b) Rebbi Yochanan establishes the two Beraisos as a Machlokes Tana'im, and they argue over whether Shinuy is Koneh or not. The author of the first Beraisa - is Rebbi Meir, who holds Shinuy Koneh, and of the second, Rebbi Yehudah, who holds that it is not (though we rejected this interpretation of Rebbi Yehudah, earlier).

(c) According to Rebbi Yehudah, despite the fact that the Sheli'ach is not Koneh, he must nevertheless bear the full brunt of the loss - as a punishment for deviating from his instructions.

(d) Rebbi Elazar queries this explanation however. Rebbi Meir might agree in the second Beraisa, that the Sheli'ach does not acquire the goods - because he only holds 'Shinuy Koneh' in connection with an article that improved intrinsically (e.g. regarding eating it, wearing it or putting it to some other use), but not with regard to goods that was purchases for investment purposes where, as long as there is monetary gain, the owner doesn't really care what the Sheli'ach purchases, and there is no Shinuy.

(a) So Rebbi Elazar - establishes both Beraisos like Rebbi Meir, and the reason that they share the increase in the second Beraisa, is because the Sheli'ach has not acquired the goods (as we explained in Rebbi Yehudah).

(b) They laughed at Rebbi Yochanan's interpretation of the second Beraisa (where the owner takes half the improvement) - because, seeing as he considers the Sheli'ach to have deviated from the owner's instructions (only, according to Rebbi Yehudah, he is not Koneh), how does the owner of the money acquire a share in the goods, seeing as the seller sold it to the purchaser, and not to him?

(c) This is not a problem with Rebbi Elazar's explanation - because according to him, the Sheli'ach has not withdrawn from the Shelichus (so whatever he purchases, he does so on behalf of the owner).

(d) Nor would it have been a problem had the Sheli'ach purchased wheat, as he was asked to do - for the same reason, since the Sheli'ach would then be purchasing the goods on behalf of the owner, as Rebbi Avahu explained to Rav Shmuel bar Sasarti.

(a) The Mishnah in Erchin states that if someone declared his property Hekdesh or who undertook to pay someone's Erech with regard to his wife's and children's' clothes and the new clothes that he dyed for them - the treasurer of Hekdesh does not have the right to claim them.

(b) The additional example that the Tana includes in this list is - the shoes that the Makdish bought on behalf of his wife and children.

(c) Rebbi Avahu attempts to prove from the fact that the new clothes that he dyed for his wife are not Hekdesh - that it must be because a man does not intend to include his wife's possessions in the Hekdesh. Otherwise, who told the seller of the dye that the man was purchasing it on behalf of his wife?

(d) Rebbi Aba however, rejects Rebbi Avahu's proof. The reason that his the dyed clothes do not belong to Hekdesh he says, is -because a man does not intend to include any of his wife's clothes (irrespective of whether they are technically hers or not).

(a) Despite the fact that, as Rebbi Aba just explained, it is a matter of the owner's intentions, the Mishnah in Erchin authorizes the treasurer to take the Ma'arich's Tefilin - because a person may well include his Tefilin in the Hekdesh (because he thinks he is performing a Mitzvah), but that does not mean that he will include his wife's clothes, which he will avoid doing at all costs, to avoid Eivah (strife).

(b) Bearing in mind that the Mishnah currently under discussion is talking about a case of Erchin as well as Hekdesh, Rav Oshaya rejects Rebbi Aba's explanation, from the Mishnah there 'Chayvei Erchin Memashkenin Osan' - which teaches us that when it comes to Erchin, the Torah does not consider the Makdish's intentions.

(c) Rebbi Aba therefore amends his original counterproof. The reason that the clothes that the Makdish dyed on behalf of his wife do not belong to Hekdesh is - because Chazal decreed that before a man declares his property Hekdesh or vows to give an Erech, all that pertains to them becomes theirs.

(a) Rav Sheishes explains the Beraisa ...

1. ... 'ha'Lokei'ach Sadeh be'Shem Chaveiro, Ein Kofin Oso Li'mekor' - to mean that if Reuven buys a field from Shimon in the name of the Resh Galusa, the latter is not obligated to sell it to Reuven to him.
2. ... 've'Im Amar Lo al-M'nas, Kofin' - that if he stipulated that the Resh Galusa must sell it to him, then he must do so.

(b) The buyer would find it necessary to do this - to dissuade would-be claimants from staking their claims in the field (out of fear of the Resh Galusa).

(c) We reconcile this with the B'nei Ma'arva, who hold of the S'vara (that we cited earlier) 'Mi Hodi'o le'Ba'al Chitin' - by establishing the Beraisa too, when he informed the seller, as well as the witnesses, that he was buying the field on behalf of the Resh Galusa.

(d) We reject Rav Sheishes' explanation however, from the Seifa of the Beraisa 've'Im Amar Lo al-M'nas, Kofin' - because what authority do we have to force the Resh Galusa to sell it to him? Why can he not decline on the grounds that he asked neither for the respect (in using him as a symbol of fear), nor for the degradation of having to sell a field at somebody else's will.

(a) Abaye finally establishes the Reisha of the Beraisa to mean 'ha'Lokei'ach Sadeh be'Shem Chaveiro Resh Galusa'. He is speaking - when he purchased a field in the name of the Resh Galusa, in which case, the seller is not obligated to sell it to him again with a new Sh'tar.

(b) The reason that the he would want a new Sh'tar is - in order to safeguard the field agaist the heirs of the Resh Galusa, who might claim the field and produce the Sh'tar to prove it.

(c) The reason that the seller is not obligated to write a new Sh'tar on behalf of the purchaser for this is - because he should have stipulated it and failed to do so.

(d) He establishes the Seifa 've'Im Amar Lo al-M'nas, Kofin' to mean - that if the buyer stipulated that the seller should write him a Sh'tar, then he is obligated to do so.