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1)

(a) We learn 'Mitzvah be'Gadol le'Yabeim' - from "ve'Hayah he'B'chor".

(b) If a younger brother performs Yibum with his Yevamah, he nevertheless acquires her.

(c) We learn from the Pasuk ...

1. ... "Asher Teiled" - that an Aylonis is Patur from Yibum.
2. ... "ve'Lo Yimacheh Sh'mo mi'Yisrael" - that the wife of a eunuch does not require Yibum.

(a) We learn from the Pasuk "Yakum al Shem Achiv" - that, whichever Yavam performs Yibum, inherits all the property of his deceased brother.

(b) The Torah does not mean that the son who is subsequently born should be called by the same name as the deceased brother - because we learn from the Gezeirah-Shavah "Yakum Al *Sheim* Achiv" (here) and "Al *Sheim* Acheihem Yikar'u be'Nachalasam" (by Ephrayim and Menasheh) that the Pasuk is referring to inheritance.

(c) Regarding this D'rashah - Rava tells us that this is the only place in the Torah where the D'rashah (the Gezeirah-Shavah) is accepted and the simple explanation ignored.

(d) According to the simple explanation, the Torah is saying that the baby that is born to them should be called after his deceased uncle. If the Torah was speaking to the Yavam, it should have written "Yakum al Shem *Achicha*"; if it is speaking to the Beis-Din, it should have written "Yakum al Shem *Achi Aviv*". In fact, the Torah is speaking to the Beis-Din, and instructing them to tell the Yavam how he should name his first-born child.

(a) In spite of the fact that the Torah writes "Bechor", we know that it is not confined specifically to the first-born - because otherwise, why would it need to preclude Eishes Achiv she'Lo Hayah be'Olamo from Yibum (seeing as he is obviously not the first-born).

(b) Nor can 'Eishes Achiv she'Lo Hayah be'Olamo' refer to a *maternal* brother - because the Torah connects Yibum with inheritance (as we have already learned), so it must be a *paternal* Bechor who performs Yibum, and not a maternal one who does not.

(c) We learn from here - that it is the oldest paternal brother who has the initial onus to perform Yibum.

(a) We know that the Torah does not write "Bechor" to tell us that when there is a Bechor, the Mitzvah takes place with any of the brothers, and when there is not, it doesn't - because the Torah writes "u'Meis Achad Meihem", implying whichever of the brothers dies, even if it is the oldest, and it goes on to say that the Bechor should perform Yibum.

(b) The Pasuk of "u'Meis Achad Meihem" cannot be speaking when the younger brother died, and it is the Bechor who performs Yibum - because if that were so, back comes the Kashya why would the Torah then need to preclude Eishes Achiv she'Lo Hayah be'Olamo from Yibum.

(c) Nor can we say that - when there is no Bechor, then a younger brother who performed Yibum may retain his Yevamah, but when there is, then it is *only* the oldest brother who can perform Yibum - because the Torah writes "Ki Yeishvu Achim Yachdav", placing *all* the brothers in the realm of Yibum.

(a) When the Tana (quoted by Abaye Keshisha) says 'Mitzvah be'Gadol le'Yabeim; Lo Ratzah, *Holchin Eitzel Achiv ha'Katan*; Lo Ratzah ... ' - he means that the initial Chiyuv lies on the oldest, then the obligation passes on to the one who is younger than him and so on. This proves that, even when there is no Bechor, the initial obligation lies on the oldest brother.

(b) We cannot learn this from the previous words 'Mitzvah be'Gadol le'Yabeim' - because that could be referring to the Bechor (and we are speaking here specifically when there is no Bechor). Otherwise, we would have brought the proof from the Mishnah in ha'Choletz 'Lo Ratzah, Chozrin Eitzel *Gadol*'.

(c) We know that even if another brother other than the Bechor performs Yibum, he still takes his deceased brother's property - because the Torah writes "Yakum al Sheim Achiv", which he did.

7)

(a) Someone who is suspected of having had relations with a Shifchah is forbidden to marry her when she is set free, and the same applies to a Nochris who converts - because he creates a bad name for himself, by substantiating the Kol.

(b) Should he nevertheless marry her however - he is not obligated to divorce her .

(c) On the other hand, someone who is suspected of adultery with a married woman *is* obligated to divorce her, should he marry her after her divorce - because in this case, it is the Torah that forbids the adulterer (as well as the woman's husband), to live with her.

(a) Rebbi Nechemyah declares the conversion of a man who converted in order to marry a Jewess, or vice-versa, invalid.

(b) He also disqualifies conversions for reasons of wealth, prestige, terror of wild animals, superstition or fear of retaliation. When he says 'ad she'Yisgayru bi'Z'man ha'Zeh' - he means that their conversion is only valid, if they converted when Yisrael were downtrodden, like they were in his days.

(c) Our Mishnah implies that the conversion of a Nochri who converts for one of these reasons is legal - because it forbids a man from marrying a woman with whom he is suspected of having had an affair, should she subsequently convert, insinuating that her conversion is nevertheless valid?

(d) Rav is quoted as ruling like the Rabbanan of Rebbi Nechemyah, who validates all of the above conversions - in which case, the author of our Mishnah will be the Rabbanan.

10)

(a) According to Rav, our Mishnah (which requires the suspected adulterer to divorce the woman, if he married her) speaks when there are witnesses that he committed adultery with her. Rav Sheishes comments - that Rav must have been asleep when he said this.

(b) He attempts to repudiate Rav's statement - from the Beraisa which permits the suspected adulterer to remain with the woman, if she first married someone else and was then divorced from him. But surely, if there two witnesses, the woman would remain forbidden to the adulterer even if someone else married her first? Consequently, the Tana must be speaking when two witnesses did not witness what took place, and we can now infer that, had someone else not married her, she would be forbidden, in spite of the absence of two witnesses (contrary to Rav's opinion)?

(c) We reject this however, by pointing out that the Tana needs to add that someone else married her first - to teach us that even though someone else married her first, the adulterer is nevertheless forbidden to marry her Lechatchilah (and not to insinuate that, had someone else not married her, she would be forbidden).

(a) If the suspected adulterer subsequently married the woman after her divorce, and had children from her, he would not be obligated to divorce her - so as not to brand her children as Mamzeirim.

(b) This concession will not apply however, should two witnesses testify that she was guilty of immorality.

(c) We now establish our Mishnah - when there were children born of their illicit relationship, to conform with Rav's initial statement (that it speaks when there were witnesses).

(d) What forced Rav to establish our Mishnah when children were born from there and therefore when there were witnesses - is the Lashon 'Hotzi'uhah', implying that Beis-Din forced her to separate from her husband, and not the husband of his own volition (for then the Tana should have written 'Hotzi'ah'), and Beis-Din will only force a man to divorce his wife when there are witnesses.

(a) Alternatively, Rav will establish the Beraisa that we quoted earlier (from which we inferred that, if not for the fact that the woman had first married someone else, the adulterer would be obligated to divorce her, even though there were no witnesses) - like the individual opinion of Rebbi (whereas *he* holds like the Rabbanan).

(b) Rebbi say that if a husband arrives home and finds a peddler leaving the house, and his wife getting dressed - he is obligated to divorce her (see Tosfos DH 'Amar'), because all the evidence is there.

(c) Similarly - if he finds the peddler leaving his house, and spittle on the roof of the four-poster bed, or shoes facing inwards so that the identity of the owner should remain hidden, he must divorce her, too.

(d) In the latter case, we cannot just check whose shoes they are - because we are not speaking when there were actually shoes there, but a mark in the dust where the inverted shoes had been.