REVIEW QUESTIONS ON GEMARA AND RASHI
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 24
YEVAMOS 24 - sponsored by Jeff Ram (Atlanta/Jerusalem), an avid Dafyomi
learner and loyal supporter of Kollel Iyun Hadaf. May he and his wife have
much Nachas from the young couple, David and Rachel, as well as all their
other children and grandchildren!
(a) From where do we learn that 'Mitzvah be'Gadol le'Yabeim'?
(b) If a younger brother performs Yibum with his Yevamah, does he acquire
(c) What do we learn from the Pasuk ...
- ... "Asher Teiled"?
- ... "ve'Lo Yimacheh Sh'mo mi'Yisrael"?
(a) What do we learn from the Pasuk "Yakum al Shem Achiv"?
(b) Perhaps the Torah means that the son who is subsequently born should be
called by the same name as the deceased brother?
(c) What Chidush does Rava tell us with regard to this D'rashah?
(d) According to the simple explanation, the Torah is saying that the baby
that is born to them should be called after hus deceased uncle. If the
Torah was speaking to the Yavam, it should have written "Yakum al Shem
*Achicha*"; if it is speaking to the Beis-Din, it should have written "Yakum
al Shem *Achi Aviv*".
To whom *is* the Torah speaking?
(a) Seeing as the Torah writes "Bechor", how do we know that any of the
other brothers can perform Yibum at all?
(b) Maybe 'Eishes Achiv she'Lo Hayah be'Olamo' refers to a maternal brother?
(c) So what do we learn from here? On whom is the initial onus of performing
(a) How do we know that the Torah does not write "Bechor" to tell us that
when there is a Bechor, the Mitzvah takes place with any of the brothers,
and when there is not, it doesn't?
(b) Perhaps the Pasuk of "u'Meis Achad Meihem" is speaking when the younger
brother died, and it is the Bechor who performs Yibum?
(c) Why can we not then say that when there is no Bechor, then a younger
brother who performed Yibum may retain his Yevamah, but when there is, then
it is only the oldest brother who can perform Yibum?
(a) What does the Tana (quoted by Abaye Keshisha) mean when he says 'Mitzvah
be'Gadol le'Yabeim; Lo Ratzah, *Holchin Eitzel Achiv ha'Katan*; Lo Ratzah
... ' (see also Tosfos DH 've'Im')? What are we trying to prove from here?
Seeing as there is no practical difference between a Bechor and the oldest
brother who is not a Bechor, why does the Torah refer to the oldest brother
(b) Why can we not learn this from the previous words 'Mitzvah be'Gadol
le'Yabeim'? How do we know that the proof is from the second statement of
the Beraisa and not from *there*?
(c) And how do we know that even if another brother other than the Bechor
performs Yibum, he still takes his deceased brother's property?
Answers to questions
(a) Someone who is suspected of having had relations with a Shifchah is
forbidden to marry her when she is set free, and the same applies to a
Nochris who converts.
Why is that?
(b) May he remain with her if he marries her illegally, or must he divorce
(c) Why, on the other hand, is someone who is suspected of adultery with a
married woman obligated to divorce her, if he married her after her divorce?
(a) What does Rebbi Nechemyah say about a man who converted in order to
marry a Jewess or vice-versa?
What does Rebbi Elazar learn from the Pasuk in Yeshayah "Hein Gor Yagur Efes
mei'Osi; Mi Gar Itach Alayich Yipol"?
(b) He also disqualifies conversions for reasons of wealth, prestige, terror
of wild animals, superstition or fear of retaliation.
What does he mean
when he says 'ad she'Yisgayru bi'Z'man ha'Zeh'?
(c) How does our Mishnah imply that the conversion of a Nochri who converts
for one of these reasons is legal?
(d) How do we then explain our Mishnah in light of the Beraisa of the above
Beraisa of Rebbi Nechemyah?
(a) According to Rav, our Mishnah (which requires the suspected adulterer to
divorce the woman, if he married her) speaks when there are witnesses that
he committed adultery with her.
What does Rav Sheishes comment on Rav?
(b) How does he attempt to repudiate Rav's statement from the Beraisa which
permits the suspected adulterer to remain with the woman, if she first
married someone else and was then divorced from him? What does he infer from
there to prove Rav wrong?
(c) We reject this however, by pointing out that the Tana needs to add that
someone else married her first, for its intrinsic Chidush.
What is the
(a) If the suspected adulterer subsequently married the woman after her
divorce, and has children from her, he is not obligated to divorce her.
(b) When will this concession not apply?
(c) How do we now establish our Mishnah to conform with Rav's initial
statement (that it speaks when there were witnesses)?
(d) What forced Rav to establish our Mishnah when there were children and
witnesses? How does he know that it does not speak when there were no
children and no witnesses?
(a) Alternatively, Rav will establish the Beraisa that we quoted earlier
(from which we inferred that, if not for the fact that the woman had first
married someone else, the adulterer would be obligated to divorce her, even
though there were no witnesses) like an individual opinion (whereas he holds
like the Rabbanan).
Answers to questions
Like which Tana does he establish it?
(b) What does Rebbi say about a husband who arrives home and finds a peddler
leaving the house, and his wife getting dressed?
(c) Which other two cases does he cite?
(d) In the latter case, why can we not just check whose shoes they are?